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This thesis examines the' need for a Standing 
Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean (STAPHIBFORMED) and 
proposes a combined European maritime force, under NATO 
auspices, to compliment US presence in the Mediterranean 
and, when necessary, to act as a substitute. The United 
States looks to simultaneously share some of the European 
regional security responsibility with its Allies while 
still maintaining its influence with European security 
matters. Concurrently, European nations have reduced their 
defense budgets and, in the spirit of Maastricht, look to 
rely on multinational defense organizations 
economic and political reasons. 
for both 
The STAPHIBFORMED concept is a mechanism for crisis 
response and peacekeeping operations that facilitates 
resource-sharing. and permits Europeans to undertake some 
missions without direct US involvement. Such a force 
promotes a distinct European Security and Defense Identity, 
reflects the NATO Strategic Concept, and helps to satisfy 
the American desire to share more of the European regional 
security burden with Europe. 
v 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I • INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 
A. BACKGROUND ....... , .............................................................................................................................. 2 
B • OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................... 4 
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................... 6 
D. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. 7 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDy .................................................................................................................. 8 








































ANCIENT AMPHIBIOUS HISTORy ..................................................................................................... 13 
Greece at Troy ........................................................................................................................... 13 
Persia at Marathon ............................................... ..................................................................... 14 
EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMPHIBIOUS HISTORy ................................................................................. 15 
GaUipoli .... ................................................................................................................................. 16 
Corfu .......................................................................................................................................... 17 
MODERN AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY ........................................................................................................ 17 
Suez Crisis .. ............................................................................................................................... 18 
Operation BLUEBAT-Lebanon 1958 ...................................................................................... 20 
Cyprus ....................................................................................................................................... 21 
Libya .................................................... ...................................................................................... 22 
Lebanon-1983-1984 ................................................................................................................ 23 
Somalia ...................................................................................................................................... 24 
Liberia ....................................................................................................................................... 26 
Albania ...................................................................................................................................... 26 
Sierra Leone .............................................................................................................................. 28 
AMPHIBIOUS CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 29 
ANALySIS ..................................................................................................................................... 3S 
GLOBAL THREATS ............................................................................................................................. 35 
MEDITERRANEAN THREATS ............................................................................................................... 39 
UNITED STATES ............................................................................................................................... 44 
EUROPE ............................................................................................................................................ 48 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ....................................................................................... 55 
NATO's Legal and Moral Authority .......................................................................................... 57 
NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue ............................................................................................. 61 
Reaction Forces ......................................................................................................................... 63 
Combined Joint Task Force ....................................................................................................... 65 
ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................. 67 
MEETING AMPHIBIOUS REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ............................ 69 
UNITED STATES .............................................................................................................................. 70 
ITALy .............................................................................................................................................. 71 
FRANCE ............................................................................................................................................ 73 
UNITED KINGDOM ............................................................................................................................. 75 
NETHERLANDS .................................................................................................................................. 77 
SPAIN .............................................................................................................................................. 78 
TURKEY ............................................................................................................................................ 80 
GREECE ............................................................................................................................................ 81 
PORTUGAL ........................................................................................................................................ 83 
PFP NATIONS ................................................................................................................................... 83 
vii 
1. Romania ...... ............................................................................................................................... 83 
2. Bulgaria ..................................................................................................................................... 85 
K. BI-LATERAL RESPONSES TO THE AMPHIBIOUS NEED ......................................•...........•.•.•.....•......•. 86 
1. Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) ................................................................................ 86 
2. United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Task Group ............................................................ 87 
L. EXISTING MULTINATIONAL PROPOSALS ..............................................................•..•.....•...............•••. 89 
1. History of European Naval Cooperation ................................................................................... 89 
2. Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean ........................................................................... 91 
3. European Maritime Force ......................................................................................................... 93 
M. CONCLUSIONS ..........•.....•...........................................................................•............•.•............••.......•. 96 
V. STAPHIBPORMED CONCEPT .......................................................................................................... 97 
A. FORCE COMPOSITION ......•..............•..........................•..............•..........•.....................................•..... 98 
B. STAPHIBFORMED MODELS ..............•.................................•.........••..•.•.........•.•..........•.•........•.•..... 99 
C. MISSIONS .....•......•...................................................................•........•................•.........•...•.•........... 102 
D. PROBLEMS ..............••.•.............•...................................................................................................... 103 
E • COMMAND AND CONTROL ......................................................•........•.......................................•......... 105 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ III 
A. CONCLUSIONS ...•....................•.........................•...............................•......................•.•.............•..•..•. III 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS .......•..........................................................................•............................•......... 116 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................. 117 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 119 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................................................................................ 129 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 3-l. NATO Reaction Forces ..................................... 64 
Figure 5-l. STAPHIBFORMED Force Structure ........................... 106 
Figure 5-2. STAPHIBFORMED Command Structure ......................... 106 
Figure 5-3. STAPHIBFORMED Operational Control ....................... 107 
LIST OF TABLES 









































TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Allied Command Europe 
Allied Forces Southern Europe (now RCSOUTH) 
ACE Mobile Force 
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps 
Amphibious Ready Group 
Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean 
Command and Control 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
and Intelligence 
Commander Amphibious Task Force 
Commander Combined ~phibious Task Force 
Component Command 
Component Command Naval Forces Southern 
Europe 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Combined Joint Task Force 
Commander Combined Landing Force 
Commander Landing Force 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (renamed OSCE as of Jan 1995) 
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
European Security and Defense Identity 
European Union 
European Maritime Force 
Forces Answerable to the Western European 
Union 
Intermediate Reaction Forces 
Joint Sub-Regional Command 
Joint Task Force 
Light Armored Vehicle 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned 
Main Battle Tank 
Military Committee 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable) 
North Atlantic Council 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Non-combatant Evacuation Operation 
National Security Strategy 
National Military Strategy 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 





















Regional Command South 
Rules of Engagement 
Rapid Reaction Forces 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force 
Standing Amphibious Forces Mediterranean 
Standing Naval Forces Channel 
Standing Naval Forces Atlantic 
Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean 
Standing Naval Forces Minesweeping 
Standing Naval Mine Counter-Measures Force 
Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern 
Europe 
Ships Taken Up From Trade 
United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Group 
United Nations 
Western European Union 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1998, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) departed the Mediterranean Sea for duty in the 
Persian Gulf. During the two months the Amphibious Ready 
Group (ARG) was engaged, the Mediterranean basin was left 
without an amphibious force capability. When regional 
instability requires a US response elsewhere, it may be 
necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), specifically the European pillar, to fill the 
lacuna left by the United States. 
This thesis examines the need for an amphibious 
capability in the Mediterranean region, analyzes the 
European Forces available to provide that capability, and 
proposes a NATO Standing Mediterranean Amphibious Force 
capable of operating with or without the United States. 
The Standing Force ties to the long, rich, amphibious 
tradition of the Mediterranean, but also is a response to 
the region's history of instability. The proposal responds 
to the current military and political climate in Europe by 
enhancing the development of a European Security and 
Defense Identity and multinational defense structures. The 
proposal also enables the United States to encourage the 
Europeans to take a larger role with regional security 
1 
issues, while maintaining the American leadership role in 
NATO. Ultimately, Europe and the United States should work 
as equal partners to ensure peace, stability, and security 
to the entire region. 
A. BACKGROUND 
with the mid-20 th century replacement of traditional 
Mediterranean naval powers-such as the UK, France, and 
Italy-with NATO, the United States has become the primary 
guarantor of political and military stability in Europe and 
the Mediterranean. In the decade following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US has continued to 
provide the military potency that has promoted peace, 
economic growth, and stability in NATO states of the 
Mediterranean. with fixed defense budgets projected into 
the next century and a rising a demand for US forces in 
regions such as the Persian Gulf and Asia, the US looks to 
mitigate growing demands for air and sea capability needed 
to defuse future Mediterranean crises before they endanger 
Western interests. 
As Europe moves towards the Maastricht goals of closer 
economic and political unity, it aspires for, but still 
struggles to achieve, a distinct European Security and 
2 
Defense Identity (ESDI). European nations face flat or 
decreasing defense budgets and look toward multilateral 
military structures as a method to enhance cooperation and 
minimize their individual deficiencies. Nevertheless, 
Europe recognizes "that security in Europe is closely 
linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. 111 
Those threats include religious fanaticism in the Maghreb, 
unrest in the Middle East, and economic disparity between 
northern Mediterranean nations and the remainder. The 
problems of the region can be attributed to the difficulty 
in reconciling the development of religious, cultural, and 
economic pluralism with the demands that this poses in 
terms of civil rights, accountability, and political 
succession. Consequently, for the majority of nations in 
the Mediterranean, security is more a question of internal 
stability than an external military matter. The European 
Union (EU) attempts to provide stability via dialogue with 
non-EU Mediterranean countries through the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. 
NATO also gives attention to a Mediterranean Dialogue 
as part of their overall cooperative approach to security. 
1 NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (98)59, Ministerial meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council, 28 May 1998 
3 
A November 1997 RAND study of Mediterranean security 
revealed that the region "has acquired increasing strategic 
importance in recent years, and in the context of growing 
instability in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, 
NATO's vital security interests may be affected.,,2 Not 
coincidentally, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept calls for a 
framework that will enable the Alliance to respond 
effectively to the changing securi ty environment by 
providing the forces and capabilities needed to deal with a 
wide spectrum of risks and contingencies. A NATO-led 
European expeditionary force may best reflect the 
Mediterranean security requirements of Europe, NATO, and 
the United States alike. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis will examine the necessity for and 
·feasibili ty of a Standing Mediterranean Amphibious Force 
(STAPHIBFORMED) within NATO. Critical attention will be 
directed at the historical precedents and current trends of 
the region, determining amphibious capability in the region 
and the role a European Expeditionary Force could play in 
the 21st century. Creation of any ESDI within NATO "aims to 
2 Nicola de Santis, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative." NATO 
Review, Spring 1998: 32 
4 
reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence 
matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link.,,3 
The formula gives the Europeans more of a voice in Alliance 
decision-making and provides the military arm of the 
European Union (EU) , the Western European Union (WEU) , the 
tools needed to carry out its own missions. Since the US 
refuses to commit forces unless they are part of an 
operation using the NATO integrated command structure or as 
part of a Combined Joint Task Force, Europeans must 
consider operating without access to American capabilities, 
such as strategic logistics and airlift that are essential 
to success in force projection missions. Therefore, the 
Europeans will need to develop independently or have access 
to NATO (and US) resources and infrastructure through 
cooperation under ESDI. Lastly, an examination of 
STAPHIBFORMED's autonomy will be made with respect to 
American foreign policy to determine whether such an 
assemblage should assume a complimentary, secondary, or 
independent role to American expeditionary forces. 
3 Luis Maria de Puig, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO." 
NATO Review, Summer 1998: 6 
5 
c. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Any organizational proposal presupposes that the 
political, economic, and military status quo of Europe and 
the United States will be maintained and that resources, 
leadership, and political structures will remain intact. 
Any number of unforeseen events could upset the European 
"apple cart," such as nuclear terrorism, alliance 
enlargement difficulties, or the removal of a democratic 
government. European states are engaged in a process that 
is slowly moving towards an ever-tighter federation, both 
politically and economically. This paper assumes that 
European cooperation and integration, both domestic and 
military, will continue and the European Monetary Unit will 
be introduced as scheduled. 
Limitations of the thesis are the relative 
inexperience of the author in the field of European 
relations and the workings of NATO. Other than duty with a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit attached to the 6 th Fleet, the 
author has never served in a NATO command. Planned release 
of a new Strategic Concept at the April 1999 Washington 
Conference, 4 as well as NATO's rapidly changing political 
4 Jan Petersen, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept," NATO Review, Surruner 1998: 18 
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and military climate, could antiquate the basis of this 
thesis. 
D. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Although official definitions note subtle differences, 
the terms Expeditionary, Amphibious, and Maritime are used 
interchangeably throughout this document. Each definition, 
according to Joint Pub 1-02 DoD Dictionary, is listed. 
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE is defined by both NATO and DoD as: 
A naval force and landing force, together with 
supporting forces that are trained, organized, 
and equipped for amphibious operations. 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE is defined by DoD as: 
An armed force organized to accomplish a specific 
objective in a foreign country. 
MARITIME FORCE is defined by both NATO and DoD as: 
Power projection in and from the maritime 
environment, including a broad spectrum of 
offensive military operations to destroy enemy 
forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy 
forces from approaching within enemy weapons' 
range of friendly forces. Maritime force may be 
accomplished by amphibious assault operations, 
attack of targets ashore, or support of sea 
control operations. 
Amphibious ship descriptions are broken into two broad 
categories: "big deck" and "small deck." Big deck 
7 
amphibious ships refer to helicopter assault ships (LHA, 
LHD, and LPH-class) that have enough deck and hanger space 
to embark a reinforced helicopter squadron and can conduct 
waterborne assaults using assault craft from the well deck. 
Big deck can also refer to CV or CVN class aircraft 
carriers, though these ships have no organic waterborne 
assaul t capability. Small deck ships refer to LPD, LSD, 
LKT, LST, and LSL-class ships that have only a nominal 
heliborne capability (usually one or two helicopters) and 
can conduct amphibious operations via waterborne assault 
from the well deck. An outline of amphibious ships is 
listed in the Appendix. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II will examine the history of the 
Mediterranean's distinct amphibious nature of naval 
warfare. Dating back to Agamemnon's naval expeditionary 
force, amphibious operations have played an important and 
unique role in Mediterranean history. Since the assault on 
Troy, battles such as Hannibal's defeat by Scipio, Tripoli, 
Gallipoli, and Anzio have demonstrated the amphibious 
character of Mediterranean naval conflict. A short history 
of twentieth century warfare in the Mediterranean will 
8 
demonstrate the applicability of an amphibious capability, 
especially when faced with economic, religious, and ethnic 
instability following the Cold War. 
Chapter III is an analysis of external factors unique 
to the Mediterranean that warrant consideration of the 
requirement for a Standing Amphibious Force. Discussion 
will start with a global abstract, and be followed by 
respective security and political concerns of the United 
States, Europe, and NATO in the Mediterranean. Within the 
global context of international crime, terrorism, 
biological warfare, rogue nuclear threats, and economic 
concern in Asia, European security affairs occupy only a 
portion of the American foreign policy effort. The 
President's National Security Strategy argues the need to 
provide global leadership through its economic strength and 
military superiority, but that has become increasingly 
difficult as force· structure and budgets decrease while 
operations have increased. 
European security remains unique to each region and 
nation despite efforts to unify and integrate. Northern 
nations have concerns with central Europe and the Baltic, 
while southern states argue that instability in the 
Mediterranean poses the greatest threat. However, the 
9 
European Union agrees that ethnic and religious unrest, 
political/economic instability, and potential for mass 
refugees and migration are considerable issues that a 
united Europe must address. 
NATO is still defining itself after the demise of the 
Soviet bloc-debates over an organization dedicated to 
collecti ve security or collective defense continue. The 
new Strategic Concept to be announced at the fiftieth 
anniversary of NATO in 1999 will most likely address out-
of-area operations and set a new course for the Alliance. 
NATO also must deal with Mediterranean threats wi thin a 
larger framework of enlargement, Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), and Russia. With respect to a European 
expeditionary capability, the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) concept will be discussed as the basis for separable 
but not separate forces 5 in support of an ESDI anchored 
securely in NATO. 
The fourth chapter presents a detailed examination of 
European navies, NATO and PfP, that can contribute to a 
European amphibious force. The American ARG template is 
dissected and compared against capabilities of European 
5 NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, Ministerial Meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council, 3 June 1996 
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navies for consideration in STAPHIBFORMED. First, 
individual nations are reviewed, followed by bilateral 
structures such as UKNLPHIBGRU and SIAF, and concluding 
with an inspection of existing multilateral organizations 
such as EUROMARFOR and CAFMED. 
In response to existing proposals for an On-Call 
European expeditionary capabilities such as EUROMARFOR of 
the WEU and the CAFMED concept developed by AFSOUTH, 
Chapter V examines STAPHIBFORMED as a permanent, standing, 
force. The US Navy's Amphibious Ready Group will be 
discussed as the template the force will be modeled after, 
along with the roles, missions, and requirements that are 
expected. Discussion will focus on whether a multinational 
establishment can perform its threefold mission of 
capability, interoperability, and reliability. Most 
importantly, command and control issues are considered, 
such as where STAPHIBFORMED is located in the NATO military 
framework and its use by the WEU, the OSCE, and the UN. 
Lastly, conclusions are drawn regarding a requirement 
for STAPHIBFORMED exists, European nations' capability, and 
the feasibility of this concept. Recommendations for the 




II. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
A. ANCIENT AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY 
Amphibious operations have defined naval warfare in 
the Mediterranean Sea since recorded time. Expeditionary 
forces have taken to the sea to wage war since the ancient 
world of the western Mediterranean-the geography of the 
southern Europe, southwest Asia, and north Africa made a 
large land army obsolete. 
1. Greece at Troy 
The Greek army at Troy was a joint expeditionary force 
operating against a fixed target. In the Illiad, Homer 
details how Agamemnon, the Commander Amphibious Task Force 
(CATF), and his Commander Landing Forces (CLF) , Achilles, 
conduct a high-intensity conflict against Troy. Achilles 
explains that this is the final piece of their Thrace 
campaign, taking twelve cities by waterborne assault and 
eleven overland. 
The Greek Expeditionary Force arrived at Troy with 
overwhelming numerical superiority, and with all the 
logistical worries of an amphibious assault. Achilles 
authorized raiding and pillaging to sustain his army, only 
to find out that Agamemnon had not kept up his side of the 
13 
plan. He neglected to impose a tight blockade around Troy, 
while Achilles worked feverishly to meet the Greeks' 
logistical requirements. The Illiad established an ancient 
precedent of maritime "forcible entry" operations. 
2. Persia at Marathon 
By 490 BC, the Greeks were pitted against Darius, the 
King of Persia and ruler most of the civilized world. 
Darius selected Oatis as both CATF and the CLF of the joint 
task force to lead 600 galleys and 85, 000 combat troops 
into battle against the growing strength of Athens on the 
Greek peninsula. 
Darius' plan was the reduction and seizure of Athens, 
followed by reduction of Sparta. Oatis selected Marathon 
for the main effort and landed unopposed, but took his time 
reorganizing and making no effort to seize the mountain 
pass leading to Athens. Miltiades, the Greek Defense Force 
commander, established a perimeter in the natural mountains 
on the three sides of the plains of Marathon. Seeing his 
cavalry would be useless, Oatis re-embarked the majority of 
his troops to sail to Athens and destroy the paltry home 
guard. 
The Greeks watched Task Force Athens sail away and 
attacked, catching the remaining 20, 000 
14 
Persians by 
surprise. The Persians counter-attacked in the center, 
while Greek forces were slowly withdrawing. When the 
Persian forces were extended, Miltiades closed the vise and 
the heavy forces in the wings destroyed the remaining 
forces. Miltiades detailed a small force to guard the dead 
and the spoil, and led the rest of his force back over the 
mountains to Athens, arriving before the Persian Task Force 
landed. Datis, realizing that it was too late to attack 
Athens, called off the operation and return to Persia. 
B. EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY 
Expedi tionary operations continued to take place in 
the Mediterranean after Marathon, despite the defeat of the 
Persian's amphibious task force. Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
establishing the importance of sea power, recognized the 
amphibious aspect of the Mediterranean and used examples 
from Publius Cornelius Scipio's victory over Hannibal due 
to the Roman supremacy of the Tyrrhenian Sea to the British 
destruction of the French fleet in the Battle of the Nile. 6 
Other operations such as Presley O'Bannon's raid of pirate 
ships in Tripoli and the British victory in the Crimean War 
6 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1890) 20 
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during the 19 th century kept the Mediterranean's maritime 
history alive. 
1. Gallipoli 
The Gallipoli campaign was to be a naval expedition to 
force the Narrows of the Dardanelles, enter the Sea of 
Marmara, and bombard Constantinople. General Sir Ian 
Hamilton, the Mediterranean Field Force commander, landed 
troops after a month-long delay allowed the Turks to ready 
their defenses. Although the Allied forces initially had 
some success, the landings were contained by Turkish 
forces. Later in the campaign two more successful 
amphibious landings were conducted, though they were both 
contained by Turkish reinforcements and unable to maneuver 
ashore and significantly expand their beachheads. For 
eight and one-half months the struggle was contained 
essentially in the beachhead areas where both sides were 
stalemated by trench warfare tactics. After employing 
almost 500,000 men, the Allies completed a withdrawal in 
January 1916 with only one casualty. Tactically, the 
battle was a draw. Casualties were estimated to be 250,000 
for both sides. Strategically, the battle was a resounding 
victory for Turkey and the Central Powers. 
16 
2. Corfu 
On 27 August 1923, General Tellini, the Italian 
President of the Commissions of Delineation who was 
appointed to mark out the frontiers of Albania, was 
ambushed and murdered. since this was Greek territory, the 
Italian government decided that Greece was morally 
responsible and should be required to make reparations. 
The Greek government failed to meet the required demands, 
and four days later, the Italian Navy landed in Greece and 
occupied the island of Corfu. 
The occupation was maintained until 27 September, by 
which date the Greek government had complied with everyone 
of the original Italian demands. 7 Italy's expeditionary 
force had achieved its well-defined objective, and in a 
manner no other expedient could have. 
C. MODERN AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY 
Most Mediterranean operations during World War II were 
dominated by amphibious operations. Operation TORCH in 
north Africa, Operation HUSKY in Sicily, and the invasion 
of Italy at Salerno were combined joint task forces, 
7 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited 
Naval Force (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994) 39 
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,-----------------------------------------------------
consisting of sea, air, and land components of the Allied 
nations. Even the land campaigns in Sicily and Italy were 
enabled by amphibious "end-runs." After the war, though, 
amphibious operations in the Mediterranean region were 
relatively non-existent until 1956. 
1. Suez Crisis 
In July 1956, Colonel Gamal Abdal Nasser announced 
that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal, which had been 
controlled until then by a mostly British- and French-owned 
·canal company. Prior to this, Israel's hope for peace at 
the 1948 armistice borders was shattered by the 
announcement in 1955 that the Soviet Union, via 
Czechoslovakia, would be providing Egypt with arms of a 
quantity and quality capable of pushing the military 
balance in its favor. The essence of war for Israel was no 
more complex than those described by Thucidydes as 
underlying the Peloponnesian War: "What made war 
inevi table was the growth of Athenian power and the fear 
this caused in Sparta.,,8 
After Egypt's nationalization of the Suez, the 
British, French, and Israelis quietly resolved to fight the 
8 Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1984) 10 
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Egyptians. On October 29, the Israelis attacked, smashing 
Nasser's ill-trained forces in the Sinai, and began driving 
toward the canal. Two days later the British and French 
began bombing Egyptian military installations and landed 
paratroops with the objective of re-taking the canal. 9 By 2 
November, the UN General Assembly (France and the UK had 
blocked Security Council action with their vetoes) called 
for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal to 1949 armistice 
lines, and reopening of the canal. The resolution passed 
overwhelmingly, with the United States and the Soviet Union 
standing together against Britain, France, and Israel. 
The flashpoint included threats of involvement by both 
the Soviet union and the United States. This was averted 
when the combatants agreed to a cease-fire and ultimately 
withdrew. Israel demonstrated its military viability, 
while both Britain and France lost their standing in the 
Middle East, having been isolated and forced to withdraw 
from a traditional area of influence. The Suez Crisis 
illustrated an early example of a multinational 
expeditionary operation but also the decline of the 
9 It must be noted that though this operation is an excellent example of 
combined expeditionary warfare, no amphibious forces were involved. 
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traditional naval powers in the Mediterranean and the 
ascendancy of the United States. 
2. Operation BLUEBAT-Lebanon 1958 
When religious conflict in Lebanon threatened to erupt 
in a civil war in the spring of 1958, Task Force 62 (2nd 
Provisional Marine Force) was alerted and began the 
planning of Operation BLUEBAT, an intervention designed to 
end factional fighting. When President Chamoun of Lebanon 
asked for intervention by the United States within 24 
hours, TF 62 promptly responded with the landing of Marines 
within six hours of his request. 10 
By the end of the month, 10,000 soldiers held a 20-
mile perimeter around Beirut. On 8 August, the force 
reached its peak of 15,000, including a regiment of tanks; 
one Marine battalion was re-embarked as a floating reserve. 
Having achieved its mission objectives, withdrawal began on 
14 September and was completed by 25 October.ll BLUEBAT was 
the largest overseas deployment of u.S. forces between the 
Korean and Vietnam wars and only an embarked expeditionary 
force could have met President Chamoun's deadline: 
10 Cable, 57 
11 Cable, 58 
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It was five days after the landing, in full force 
of seaborne Marines from 18-knot transports, 
before the first lightly armed airborne troops 
reached Lebanon and that only happened after 
delicate and uncertain negotiations, in a tug-of-
war for overflight permissions from each country 
in the paths of the transport planes. 12 
Fortunately for all concerned, fighting proved 
unnecessary, since Lebanon had faced no real threat. In 
his eagerness to display the resolve of the United States, 
President Eisenhower resorted to the use of an 
expeditionary force as crisis manager. 13 
3. Cyprus 
As a result a Greek-sponsored coup and the subsequent 
Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1974, a contingent of 
U.S. Marine forces attached to the 34 th Marine Amphibious 
Unit (MAU) was dispatched to the waters surrounding the 
embattled island of Cyprus. The Marine force evacuated 752 
persons representing 22 nations .14 Pre-deployment planning 
for the possibility of the evacuation had been so complete 
12 Cable, 58 
13 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996) 423 
14 Maj W. Hays Parks USMC, "Foreign Policy and the Marine Corps." u.s. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, November 1976: 20 
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that the embarked stores were able to supply diapers for 
the infant children of the evacuees. 
4. Libya 
Although the United States did not land troops, they 
conducted a series of maritime actions against Libya in the 
1980s. The first occurred in August 1981 when Muammar 
Qaddafi declared the 32~ parallel a "Line of Death" and all 
water south to be sovereign Libyan waters. The United 
States, determined to sail in international waters, 
conducted OPEN OCEAN MISSILE EXERCISE wi thin the Gulf of 
Sidra. On August 19, a Libyan aircraft section fired a 
missile at two American F-14s, and the resulting response 
was the downing of both Libyan Su-22 aircraft. Before the 
exercise ended, Qaddafi's air force challenged the American 
battle group forty-five times, 15 but conducted only one 
hostile act. 
When American warplanes attacked Libya in 1986, it was 
borne out of retribution for the bombing of a West Berlin 
nightclub that killed two American servicemen. Air Force 
F-111s from England and carrier-based aircraft from the 6th 
Fleet bombed military and political targets in Tripoli and 
15 Gregory L. Vistica, Fall From Glory (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1995) 121 
22 
Benghazi, the nation's second largest city. The attacks 
targeted terrorist facilities and aimed to prevent the 
training of future terrorists. 
s. Lebanon-1983-1984 
The Peacekeeping Task Force used in Lebanon in 1983 is 
one of the most vivid examples of an expeditionary 
capability. A force consisting of 1200 Marines was 
deployed at the Beirut airport to provide a buffer between 
the withdrawing Syrian and Israeli armies until the 
Lebanese armed forces could provide their own internal 
security. 
Supporting the force would be the 16-inch guns of the 
USS New Jersey offshore. The American task force fired 
into the Lebanese hills in support of the Marines ashore. 
To the fighting sects, it appeared that the United States 
was no longer a. peacekeeping force, but one that had sided 
with the Christian government. The response of the Islamic 
Jihad was a truck bomb on October 23 rd that· killed 241 
Marines in their barracks at the airport. By February 
1984, the decision was made to pull the Marines out of 
Lebanon, their mission, undetermined and vague, a failure. 
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6. Somalia 
The American 6th Fleet's area of responsibility is 
vast, encompassing not only the Mediterranean, but also the 
West Coast of Africa. Al though eastern Africa is the Sth 
Fleet's and CENTCOM's responsibility, the expeditionary 
force that came ashore in Somalia in 1992 is relevant due 
to the security impact on the Fleet and the 
Mediterranean in general. 
In November 1992, UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Gali 
reported that traditional peacekeeping in the form of the 
SOO-man force already in Somalia was not working and looked 
to peace enforcement as a possible solution. 16 The United 
States led a UN authorized United Task Force (UNITAF) in an 
operation known as RESTORE HOPE. The mission of UNITAF: 
restore peace, stability, law and order; re-establish the 
Somali police force; provide security and assistance in the 
repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced 
persons; monitor the arms embargo and to facilitate 
disarmament; and assist in the provision of relief and the 
16 Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1996) 116 
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economic rehabilitation of Somalia. 
to reconstruct the Somali state. 17 
Approximately 30,000 troops 
In effect, they were 
from 22 countries 
participated in the peacekeeping effort. By late January 
1993, the stabilization process was well enough along to , 
re-embark the Marines of the Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) to remain off the coast to remind the Somali warlords 
that "a posse," in the words of Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin 
Powell "is still on dutY',"18 
Following the replacement of UNITAF with UN Operation 
in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993, the peace 
enforcement mission turned violent, graphically illustrated 
by the death of eighteen US Army Rangers in October. The 
consent of the factions depended on impartiality and 
overwhelming US force. When the UN decided to pursue the 
warlord Aideed, the presumption of impartiality dissipated. 
Peace enforcement operations by nature threaten the 
presumption of impartiality as it presumes an adversary and 
action against one side or sides in a conflict, thus 
requiring the retention of forces fully capable of 
conducting an offensive mission. 
17 Carr and Ifantis, 117 
18 "Operation Restore Hope." U.S. News &. World Report. 14 December 1992: 28 
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7. Liberia 
On 20 April 1996, a reinforced rifle company from the 
22nd MEU (SOC) was airlifted into the U. S. embassy compound 
in Monrovia, Liberia in order to provide security and 
assist the embassy and its small Marine detachment in 
evacuation of American and designated foreign citizens due 
to continuing unrest and increased lawlessness in the 
capital. Called ASSURED RESPONSE, the U.S. European 
Command designated the MEU's CO as Joint Task Force (JTF) 
commander. The 22nd MEU assisted the evacuation of 2100 
people19 from Liberia during the most recent involvement of 
the U. S. Marine Corps to war-torn Liberia. This was not 
the first time US Marines had been to Liberia. From May 
1990 to January 1991, the 22 nd and 26 th MEU(SOC)s assisted in 
the evacuation of more than 2400 people, including 226 
Americans, in the midst of an insurgency during Operation 
SHARP EDGE.20 
8. Albania 
On 12 March 1997 JTF SILVER WAKE was activated to plan 
for a noncombatant evacuation (NEO) operation of Americans 
19 "Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: Liberia." Marine Corps Gazette." June 1996: 5 
20 "Operation SHARP EDGE. N Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991: 76 
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from the embassy in Tirana, Albania. The 26 th MEU (SOC) 
began the evacuation within 30 minutes of receiving the 
order and extracted nearly 400 Americans and over 500 
foreign nationals from more than 30 countries. 21 
In six days, 10,619 Albanians 22 crossed the Adriatic to 
land in Italy. Concerned these migrants were coming for 
economic reasons, the Italian Navy began aggressive 
patrolling and "convincing" refugees to return to home. 
The Italians determined that intervention in Albania was 
necessary to restore order, ensure humanitarian aid, and 
stem the tide of refugees. When the WEU proved too 
paralyzed to act, Italy prevailed on the United Nations for 
a mandate to lead an international force of 6,000 
soldiers. 23 The United Nations endorsed a three-month 
intervention for humanitarian reasons to be called 
Operation ALBA. The Italian leadership of the a UN 
"military-humanitarian mission"24 represented a break from 
precedent, as the United States had led all previous 
21 John T. Germain, "Operation SILVER WAKE. H Marine Corps Gazette, September 
1997: 65 
22 Ted Perlmutter, "The Politics of Proximity: The Italian Response to the 
Albanian Crisis." International Migration Review, Spring 1998: 203 
23 Perlmutter, 203 
24 Office of Naval Intelligence, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997) 4 
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missions. Italy was the natural leader of the military 
mission-it had the strongest motive to act. Joining 
Italy's 2500 soldiers were 1000 French, 700 Turks, 680 
Greeks, 450 Spaniards, 400 Romanians, 120 Austrians, and 60 
Danes. 25 ALBA's Multinational Protection Force provides 
some evidence of European states' ability to deal 
collectively with a Mediterranean security problem. 
The utility of a European Amphibious Force was never 
more apparent when a civil war erupted in Zaire during the 
Alba:nian crisis and prompted Navy and Marine Corps 
commanders to begin emergency planning for Operation 
GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL26, a Noncombatant Evacuation, before 
SILVER WAKE was even complete. While the big-deck LHA, 
containing most of the MEU's firepower, logistics, and 
troops, steamed for the West coast of Africa, the Nashville 
(LPD) and Pensacola (LSD) remained in the Adriatic to 
assist the continuing efforts in Albania. 
9. Sierra Leone 
After Zaire stabilized somewhat, fighting and looting 
spread to Freetown, Sierra Leone when the democratically 
25 Perlmutter, 206 
26 Scott C. Turner, "The U.S. Navy in Review. H U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, May 1998: 87 
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elected President Ahmed Kabbah was ousted and sent into 
exile. The Navy steamed to Freetown to begin the first of 
three evacuation operations, supported by over 200 Marines 
on the ground, fast attack vehicles, AH-1 Cobra 
helicopters, and AV-8B Harriers. Despite coup leaders' 
warnings that they had closed the borders and banned all 
foreign aircraft, over 900 evacuees, of whom 336 were 
American, were evacuated. 27 
Marines returned on 1 June with six Light Armored 
Vehicles (LAV) and a 300-man force to escort civilians who 
had taken up refuge in a hotel in the middle of the city. 
By the end of the day, 247 additional people had been 
evacuated. A third operation of NOBLE OBLISK evacuated 
nearly 1250 individuals two days later-for a total of 2500 
people, to include 451 Americans. 28 
D. AMPHIBIOUS CONCLUSIONS 
with all of the Mediterranean and most African nations 
accessible by water, Europe's southern security must 
include a distinct amphibious dimension in order to have a 
viable crisis response instrument. The history of the 20 th 
27 "22nd MEU Remains Busy. W Marine Corps Gazette, July 1997: 6 
28 Scott C. Turner, 90 
29 
century outlined above illustrates that a capable, well-
trained expeditionary force can have an immediate impact in 
regions of national interest. Vice Admiral Steve Abbot 
(USN), emphasized the importance of that impact, "the key 
to these operations are ready forces, properly 
positioned. ,,29 VADM Abbot confirmed what Alfred Thayer 
Mahan concluded a century earlier, "that sea campaigns lead 
logically to amphibious assault.,,30 
However, errant use of expeditionary power, due to the 
lack of preparedness and complexity of an amphibious 
campaign, can lead to crushing defeat (e.g., Persians at 
Marathon) . Inductively, amphibious operations in the 
Mediterranean reveal these conclusions: Amphibious 
operations must have clearly delineated political goals; 
must be self-sufficient or a have protected lines of 
communication; have obj ectives attainable by the forces at 
'hand; and most importantly, have unity of command. Failure 
to adhere to basic principles of war can deny an 
expeditionary force the opportunity to shape foreign policy 
through decisive, capable action. 
29 VADM Steve Abbot USN, U.S. Navy Commander Sixth Fleet, before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee concerning operational 
readiness, Washington DC, 25 February 1998 
30 W. H. Russell, "Amphibious Doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan." Marine Corps 
Gazette, February 1956: 35 
30 
Being sea-based, expeditionary forces remain a 
conspicuous and mobile example of national or international 
resolve, providing, in the words of former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "the visible capability that 
serves to deter many acts of aggression." 31 Experience has 
shown that attempts to deploy forces by air are fraught 
with difficulty in seeking landing, staging, and overfly 
rights, and are inadequate from a logistics standpoint. 
General Carl Mundy, the 21st Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
stated that "forward presence, war avoidance, crisis 
management, and a host of humanitarian operations are all 
best accomplished by naval forces that feature amphibious 
forces as their centerpiece."32 
While at sea, an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is self-
sufficient and politically benign, requiring no right of 
passage to operate in international waters. It sends a 
political signal by demonstrating capability and resolve. 
Naval presence-historically known as "showing the flag"-is 
defined as "the use of naval forces, short of war, to 
31 Parks, 21 
32 Gen Carl Mundy USMC, "Soldiers of the Sea: Versatile Forces for an 
Uncertain Era. H Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 August 1994: 61 
31 
achieve political objectives. "33 The value of naval 
presence lies in its potential rather than kinetic energy. 
It is a tactic of conflict avoidance executed through 
preventive deployments. Furthermore, the force can remain 
poised over the horizon for a prolonged period in times of 
tension. The characteristics of flexibility, mobility, and 
presence allow policy makers a credible military option to 
any contingency. As Cdre Paul Stone, former British 
commodore of Amphibious Warfare stated: 
Politicians can use this flexible instrument to 
achieve a delicate balance between deterrence and 
provocation-either by exerting pressure without 
violating the terri tory or airspace of the opponent, 
or by withdrawing without conceding ground or losing 
diplomatic face 34 
Thus, the missions of naval presence and projection of 
power ashore are inseparable. While neither humanitarian 
missions nor evacuations meet the technical definitions of 
proj ection of power ashore, the appearance of an on-site, 
task organized expeditionary force can provide a policy 
response to a variety of mission requirements, however 
unusual, including forcible entry. To be effective in 
33 VADM Stansfield Turner USN, "Missions of the U.S. Navy." Naval War College 
Review, March-April 1974: 2-17 
34 Henry van Loon, "Amphibious Interest, European NATO-Countries Strengthen 
Their Shore-Storming Capability." Armed Forces Journal International, 
September 1998: 66 
32 
these operations, amphibious forces must be ready and close 
at hand to have an immediate impact. 
Politically, deployment of Army forces has 
historically been perceived as a commitment to a sustained 
land campaign, both signaling and requiring the long-term 
effort of the United States. As former US Army Chief of 
Staff, General Frederick C. Weyand stated, \\ .in greater 
degree perhaps than the other services, if and when the 
Army is committed, the United States is committed. "35 An 
expeditionary force can land on sovereign soil and, whether 
in a humanitarian mission or in response to hostile 
actions, suggest the limited nature of the mission while 
serving as a continuum of the naval presence mission. 





Security in the Mediterranean is embedded in the 
interaction of localizing and globalizing forces, meaning 
regional threats will ,have to be dealt with by regional 
powers supported by an international consensus. An ideal 
vehicle to meet that order is a combined amphibious force 
in the Mediterranean under the direction of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. As President Clinton said at 
the 1996 Berlin Summit: 
Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against 
direct military invasion. Tomorrow's NATO must 
continue to defend enlarged borders and defend 
against threats to our security from beyond them-
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic 
violence and regional conflict. "36 . 
NATO must do this in part because non-Article V 
threats can become Article V threats if they are not 
addressed early. 
A. GLOBAL THREATS 
The threat of terrorism is a constant and long-term 
threat to established democracies throughout the world. As 
the August 1998 bombings of United States' embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya show, terrorism is global and the fear 
35 
it causes is universal. The rise in terrorism comes, in 
part, from the breakdown of central authority and 
domination of the former USSR. Despi te optimism at the 
conclusion of the Cold War, ancient loyalties have not 
withered in the face of technology, democracy, and 
introduction of free market economies. This has led to a 
growing assertion of both sub-national and transnational 
calls for "self determination." These groups deny the 
legitimacy of what they perceive to be a discredited 
international order. Indeed, "many groups and movements 
have fed upon a reaction that is sometimes viewed as the 
secular immorality of the west.,,37 
Traditional motivations for terrorism include ethnic, 
tribal, and religious animosities. Perhaps more ominous is 
the growing significance of apolitical groups which resort 
to terrorism in pursuit of a personal or religious agenda. 
These groups, including narco-terrorists, are particularly 
difficult to contain and predict given their vast resources 
from illicit trade, and because of their ability to 
influence and control governments where they operate. 
36 William Clinton, "Address to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.· 
Berlin, 6 September 1996. 
37 Prof Frank Teti, Naval Postgraduate School Lecture, Monterey, CA, 12 
December 1997 
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Additionally, sea-borne violence had increased, 
constituting more than mere piracy, as more and more 
militant groups seek to further their political aims 
offshore. 38 
A growing concern exists that terrorists will engage 
in acts of mass or "super terrorism" by using nuclear, 
biological, or chemical weapons. The crumbling of the 
Soviet Union could result in illicit trade in weapon grade 
plutonium and commensurate technology. Cities may be held 
hostage by threats to poison the water supply or to 
disseminate any number of dangerous chemicals or biological 
agents. 
These Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats can 
come from either sovereign states or rogue actors that have 
developed or purchased this capability. The UN Securi ty 
Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of 
WMD constituted a threat to international peace and 
security.39 The potential for proliferation is increased by 
the availability of nuclear technology, a trend likely to 
38 Anthony Forster, "An Emerging Threat Takes Shape as Terrorists Take to the 
High Seas. H Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Jul 98: 23. Maritime Terrorism 
includes the hijacking of ships, reflagging them, and selling their contents. 
Also, organizations will hold a crew and ship for ransom until the shipping 
company pays 
39 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995) 84 
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be accelerated by the break-up and privatization of the 
Soviet military-industrial complex. 
Terrorism is unpredictable and almost impossible to 
prevent. Though none of the numerous Alliance port 
facilities, air bases, or military installations have been 
seriously attacked, a coordinated terrorist assault could 
have a devastating effect on the response capability of 
NATO. That it is difficult to point to an example of an 
amphibious force that did combat terrorism or how 
terrorists were deterred is more a statement on luck than 
preparedness. 4o It is vital that the Atlantic Alliance has 
redundant deterrence and retaliatory capabilities from 
land, sea, and air. A standing amphibious force floats 
generally safe from terrorist action, an untouchable entity 
that provides deterrence by nature of its mobility and its 
threat of potential retaliation. 
Threats of terrorism, ethnic and tribal warfare, WMD, 
and political instability exist for Europe and the 
Mediterranean. The international response to the 
contradictory world of \\ integration and fragmentation"41 is 
40 An example of a maritime force deterring terrorism is difficult to provide, 
though a good illustration of retaliation to terrorism is Israel's OPERATION 
JONATHAN in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976, and the US Navy to Libya in 1986 
41 Dr. Javier Solana, "Preparing NATO for the 21 st Century.H Secretary General's 
Keynote Address at the Maritime Symposium, Lisbon, Portugal, 4 September 98 
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a multi-faceted approach that focuses on prevention through 
diplomatic means-like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-
backed by a credible threat of force. The establishment of 
a standing multinational force precludes international 
assent and physically manifests its resolve. A capable, 
well-trained, readily available force is needed to act as a 
deterrent, and a potent response in cases where the 
defensive posture of the Alliance is threatened. 
B. MEDITERRANEAN THREATS 
The Mediterranean region has corne to be symbolized by 
Samuel Huntington as a North/South clash of civilizations. 42 
Divided by religious, economic, and political differences, 
The RAND Corporation' describes the Mediterranean as an "arc 
of crisis.,,43 Divisions between the "haves" and "have-nots" 
pose the largest threat, however, not as differences 
themselves, but in. the instability they cause. With 
respect to Arab-Israeli tensions, main threats to security 
in the region are internal and have their roots in economic 
disparities. 
42 Samuel P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 
43 F. Stephen Larrabee and Carla Thorson, Mediterranean Security: New Issues 
and Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996) 11 
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The Mediterranean can be seen economically, "as the 
place where the Persian Gulf begins. ,,44 For the Uni ted 
States and developed European nations, many common 
strategic interests are at stake along NATO's southern 
flank. The Mediterranean supports the world's busiest 
shipping lanes-65% of Europe's oil and natural gas imports 
pass through on 3, 000 ships daily. 45 In the Gulf War, 90% 
of war materiel that went to the Gulf went through the 
Mediterranean. 46 Maintaining the lines of communication and 
access to markets is essential for economic and political 
security in the region. 
Immediate threats to regional security are social and 
economic, though a long-term military threat can emerge. 
For southern Mediterranean countries, the growing North-
South economic gap is bound to fuel domestic instability 
and radicalization of politics along religious lines. The 
by-product of economic marginalization will be Islamic 
fundamentalism with strong anti-western attitudes. The 
presence of one or more regimes hostile to European 
44 Larrabee and Thorson, 10 
45 de Santis, 34 
46 Larrabee and Thorson, 10 
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hegemony and American imperialism will directly influence 
the security of Europe and American interests. 
combined with economic imbalances, population growth 
and migration present another cause for concern. The North 
African population is expected to grow from about 63 
million today to 142 million by 2025. In the same period, 
the population of the southern European members of NATO is 
expected to grow by only 5 ~illion.47 The resulting 
demographic imbalance may result in massive migration 
pressures from Africa to southern Europe, which will find 
it increasingly difficult to absorb large amounts of 
immigrants. Efforts to restrict immigration may provoke a 
hostile response from regimes in North Africa. 
Another, more sinister, by-product of economic 
incongrui ty is the proliferation and acquisition of 
inexpensive, accurate, high-tech weapons, such as ballistic 
'missiles and WMD, by states or organizations not friendly 
to the West. Libya and Algeria are poised as potential 
chemical weapon states, and the mere fact of possession has 
implications for regional relations. Rooted in socio-
economic inequality, the subsequent fundamentalist regime, 
spawned by instability and tension, will pose serious 
47 de Santis, 34 
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security problems and alter the strategic situation of the 
entire Mediterranean littoral. 
The fundamentalism and violence of Algeria-the death 
toll in a bitter civil war has reached 30,OOO-demonstrates 
both the inability of Europe to make an influence in the 
former colonies, and of tragic levels of death and 
destruction. The EU and NATO cannot afford to turn their 
backs on Algeria. The development of a fundamentalist 
government in Algeria could have repercussions throughout 
Arabic-speaking North Africa. Said NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana, "Look at the disparity in incomes between 
north and south, combine that with population growth and 
you have the ingredients for the conflict between Islam and 
Europe that has made up so much of the unhappy history of 
the Mediterranean. "48 
The force shaping political evolution in the Maghreb49 
is fundamentalism: either ethnic or religious. Extremism 
succeeds and creates instability wherever under-
development, obsolescence, and unemployment occur-whether 
48 Michael Sheridan, "Europe Must Look South, Not East.· The Independent 
(London), 8 February 1995: 17. Dr. Solana made these remarks while acting as 
the Spanish Foreign Minister 
49 The Maghreb, or "land on which the sun sets· consists of the Moslem nations 
of northern Africa. It is "West," distinct from other nations of the Middle 
East, the Mashreq, or "East" 
42 
it is in Marseilles or Algiers. The upsurge of religious 
zeal comes as the poor and disenfranchised seek a new way 
of life to replace the dogmas of state socialism and Arab 
nationalism. The National Front's victory in southern 
France in 1997 emerged from the same problems of strife in 
Algeria, and also featured some of the same people, 
refuting any theory that the Mediterranean is a frontier 
against instability. In sum, the next confrontation could 
grow out of any number of explosive factors-economic 
difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, 
immigration, of which are prevalent in the southern 
region. 50 
The emerging challenges require a concerted approach 
of the two main initiatives, those of the EU and NATO. 
Though they seek different goals, the EU's Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue 
are complementary since they address different aspects of 
the same issues. Unless European nations engage North 
Africa, else the commercial success and material wealth 
created without respect to the "have-nots" will create the 
instability that threatens peace and sustained economic 
50 William Drozdiak. "Instability to the South Worries US Forces in Europe." 
The Washington Post. 19 May 1997: AI. Statement carne in an interview with ADM 
T. Joseph Lopez. CINC AFSOUTH 
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growth. On the other hand, the WMD proliferation issue 
raises the importance of a flexible, credible force not 
only as a deterrent, but also as a retaliatory capability. 
c. UNITED STATES 
The United States' 1998 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) , titled A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century, identifies major threats 'to American security and 
establishes three principle security objectives: Enhancing 
security with existing forces; bolstering American economic 
interests, and promoting democracy. The American strategy 
for achieving these mutually supporting objectives is 
through global leadership and shared collective security 
responsibilities. The North Atlantic Alliance is the 
principal security institution through which to shape the 
European and Mediterranean environment in ways favorable to 
the US and Allied interests. US management of the post-
Cold War peace is guided by the conviction that America's 
prosperity depends upon the preservation of an inter-
dependent international economy. The condition for 
economic interdependence, achieved through engagement of 
American Allies, is geopolitical stability. 
44 
To attain the three objectives of the NSS, the US has 
to maintain a strong influence in Europe, with mutually 
supporting economic and security strategies. The United 
States is, and will remain, a European power, because its 
self-interest lies in not departing Europe, just as it was 
decided in the late 1940s not to repeat the mistake of 
1919. Thus, American insistence on maintaining its 
interest in NATO as the central focus of European defense 
was to maintain its own influence as a central participant 
in the European security debate. 
The NSS recognizes that the nation cannot, as Henry 
Kissinger states, "remedy every wrong and stabilize every 
dislocation, ,,51 but it can achieve burden sharing and 
prevent re-emergence of a destructive set of regional 
powers through multilateralism and cooperation. The 
Atlantic Alliance has proven to work best when the United 
States is prepared to engage and when it is prepared to 
lead. The US aims to reconcile the ambition of greater 
European autonomy while maintaining the trans-Atlantic link 
by providing support for the development of ESDI within 
NATO and making assets available for WEU operations. The 
US has no interest in contributing assets, or becoming a 
51 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) 805 
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"lending library"52 to anything other than an organization 
authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 
Shape, Respond, Prepare Now, the 1997 National 
Military Strategy, identifies the military's role in 
shaping the international environment in order to promote 
peace and stability. The United State's Armed Forces are 
engaged in the Mediterranean and throughout the world, 
shaping an unpredictable international environment through 
their use of civil-military relations, deterrence, and 
threat of overwhelming force. Maintaining this strategy is 
difficult given the widespread budget and force reductions. 
Total active duty forces have been reduced from 2.2 million 
personnel in 1990 to 1.45 million in 1998. 53 During that 
same period, however, operation tempo has risen, as the US 
engaged in several operations other than war, notably 
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and North Korea. 
This paradox of force reduction and operation tempo was 
identified by former Commandant of the Marine Corps Carl 
Mundy, "While the Marine Corps has been drawn down to a 
strength of 174,000 from a Gulf War high of 196,000, the 
52 Mathias Jopp, Adelphi Paper 290, Strategic Implications of European 
Integration (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994) 39 
53 Frederick F. Y. Pang, Assistant Secretary of defense for force management 
policy, before the Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Washington, DC, 16 March 1996 
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percentage of forward-operating Marines has actually 
increased." 
The US Sixth Fleet, operating in the Mediterranean, 
has been called upon to respond to crises, on average, 
every four months since 1991. 54 During the Jan/Feb and 
October 1998 crises in Iraq, 10,000 sailor and Marines that 
normally constitute the bulk of the maritime power 
projection forces in the Mediterranean were absent. When a 
big deck amphibious ship is sent to equatorial Africa or 
CVN Task Force is deployed to the Persian Gulf, those 
assets are not readily available to respond to a "911" call 
in the Mediterranean or Europe. Despite a "strategic 
reserve" of 84, 000 troops in Germany55 and with respect to 
the US Air Force in Europe, United States impact in the 
Mediterranean is primarily through maritime power. 
A combined, permanent amphibious force in the 
Mediterranean is an excellent example of the ESDI agreement 
and reflects the United States' eagerness to share the 
burdens of global leadership without compromising its 
position as the world's lone superpower. NATO's assumption 
of responsibility for security and stability in Central, 
54 VADM Abbot's address 
55 Drozdiak, A2 
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Eastern, and Southern Europe after the Cold War reflects 
this new relationship. Europeans will have an organization 
wi th which to more effectively impact regional disputes, 
with the support and assets of the United States. Genuine 
concern exist that American responsibilities in the Persian 
Gulf and equatorial Africa will result in an absence of 
representation in the Mediterranean. 56 A combined European 
amphibious force is one vehicle by which American interests 
could be represented via the North Atlantic Council and 
Europe's interests represented via ESDI. 
D. EUROPE 
With the conclusion of the Cold War, it would seem 
natural for the US Navy's 6th Fleet, no longer tasked to 
"blunt and turn back any Soviet naval thrust westward, "57 to 
disengage somewhat for a "Eurofleet" 58 to emerge. Member 
states of the Europe Union, like the United States, have 
experienced declining defense budgets since the end of the 
56 Concern comes from both the North Atlantic Council [NATO Communique M-NAC-l 
(98)59] and the United States. In a 1997 public statement from the former 
CINCUSACOM and SACLANT Commander, USMC Gen John Sheehan raises the issue of 
scaling back US forward deployments in duration and frequency 
57 Richard Kolb and David Colley, "Facing Down the Soviets. N Veterans of 
Foreign Wars Magazine," February 1998: 33 
58 Eric Grove, "A European Navy: New Horizon or False Dawn?N Jane's Navy 
International, 1 November 1996: 31 
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Cold War. This has resulted in a new military focus, 
balancing budgetary needs with smaller, more utilitarian 
forces. Rather than encourage the reduction of the 
American hegemony in European security, Europe wants to 
ensure the US's continued support and multinational 
leadership to amend their security deficiencies. At the 
same time, Europe wants to preserve and enhance its 
collective defense capability. 
As Europe moves towards Maastricht goals of closer 
economic and political unity, it aspires for a distinct 
ESDI. European nations have been looking towards 
multilateral military struct"ures in order to minimize their 
own deficiencies. Europe's goal is to secure collective 
defense and contribute to collective security without 
further encouraging re-nationalization. 59 Multinationality 
promotes cohesion, reinforces the transatlantic link, and 
demonstrates Alliance solidarity and commitment to 
collective defense. Moreover, multinational formations may 
impede "force structure free fall" as nations seek to 
maximize the peace dividend. GO 
59 Jopp, 37 
GO William T. Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend 
or the Whirlwind? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995) 22 
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Historically, international alliances have been formed 
to meet perceived security threats; they are not forged to 
achieve a political federation. The Maastricht treaty aims 
to repudiate this logic by creating an inter-governmental 
defense as an implied condition to political union. The 
traditional division in Europe between politics and 
military has been altered, and the EU and NATO have become 
partners in ensuring security. 
EU consists of three pillars: 
Following Maastricht, the 
first is the existing Ee, 
the second calls for a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the third allows for inter-government 
cooperation. 61 Additionally, the EU will "request the 
Western European Union, which is an integral part of the 
development of the European Union, to elaborate and 
implement discussions and actions of the Union which have 
defense implications." 62 
The EU's CFSP contribution to European and 
international security will be more diplomatic, political, 
and economic than military. Those contributions, however, 
are insufficient once a conflict is escalated militarily. 
Consensus-building, force planning, and combined training 
61 Carr & Ifantis, 16 
62 Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, Article J.4.2, 1991 
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prior to an emergency are the best ways to ensure a rapid, 
unified, and capable response in the event that diplomatic 
negotiations unravel. To execute the CFSP, members must be 
proactive rather than reactive to play a supranational 
counterweight to national interests. A multinational force 
staged in the proximity of trouble acts as both a deterrent 
and a show of solidarity to the aggressors. 
The long-standing debate over the proper role of ESDI 
reached a final verdict at the January 1994 NATO Summit in 
Brussels. Although the US saw the development of ESDI as 
assuming a more equitable share of the European security 
burden, it recognized that the benefits would be lost if 
competition for scarce resources developed. ESDI would 
henceforth be shaped within the Alliance-the alternative to 
an autonomous role-and the Alliance would adapt "political 
and military structures to reflect the full spectrum of its 
roles and the development of the emerging European Security 
and Defense Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined 
Joint Task Forces." 63 Thus, NATO supports the development 
of ESDI within NATO by making available assets and 
capabili ties for WEU operations and providing support for 
the WEU-led operation as an element of a CJTF. 
63 NATO Handbook, Appendix XII, 269 
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Although the WEU has made progress with the 
strengthening of a Planning Cell, it is still far from 
being able to manage large-scale operations, particularly 
due to Europe's lack of strategic transport, c4r, logistics, 
precision-guided munitions, and satellite capabilities. In 
principle, WEU units will be multinational, drawing on a 
dual-hatting formula by using national forces and NATO 
assets such as headquarters, c4 r, and logistics of nations 
which are NATO-assigned or FAWEU. 
However, traditional suspicion and political posturing 
of European nations make credible multinational forces 
suspect if left to European nations alone. The United 
States is in the unique position of being the only nation 
that the other members of the Alliance trust. As 
impressive as the institutional developments of the WEU may 
be, its policies and operations are in contrast. The lack 
of a coherent EU policy during the early years of the 
Yugoslav crisis and the virtual absence of Europe during 
the Gulf War revealed the practical problems. 
The Balkans crisis was the first test of Europe's CFSP 
and ability to deal with a regional problem. Europe's 
response was a failure, as it wasn't until the United 
States acted, through force and command structures of NATO, 
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that a credible response was made to end the fighting in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. To be fair, "Europe" as a political 
enti ty, was in an embryonic stage when hostilities broke 
out, but throughout the crisis, the Twelve were unable or 
unwilling to establish effective solutions to fighting. 
The policy was inconsistent and inadequate. The WEU and 
NATO played their respective roles in enforcing or 
supporting UN Resolutions, but the European initiate failed 
to prevent an escalation of conflict or to end it. The 
evident lack of willingness to play an active role in the 
sUb-region undermined their credibility. 
Yugoslavia exposed the flaws behind the desire for 
European uni ty . The weakness of Europe's CFSP cannot be 
totally held responsible for the Balkans, as all of the 
organizations were supposed to form the basis for "a new 
European security architecture in which NATO, the OSCE, the 
'EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each 
other. ,,64 Unfortunately in 1998, a similar scenario 
appeared in Kosovo, when Slobodan Milosevic tightened the 
clamps on the ethnically Albanian province of Yugoslavia. 
Europe, lacking the political will to intervene militarily, 
64 S. Nelson Drew, McNair Paper 35, NATO From Berlin to Bosnia (Washington DC: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995) 31 
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dithered for most of the spring and summer of 1998 while 
hundreds of Kosovars were killed and the refugee crisis 
grew to unmanageable proportions. 65 
Current European security is a function of consensus 
building and "coalitions of the willing." Unlike 
alliances, which have an enduring element, Europeans have 
relied on ad hoc, short-term, unpredictable coalitions of 
principal nations in a feeble attempt to carry out European 
foreign policy.66 Moving toward a permanent force structure 
would establish a strong role in cementing an ESDI capable 
of responding to a variety of security challenges. In this 
respect, a standing force capable of action following a 
political decision would best serve Europe. Existing NATO 
political and military structures provide the best vehicle 
for a well-informed decision without rancor and an 
efficient execution. 
A standing multinational amphibious force could 
minimize the difficulties of coalition warfare and enhance 
65 In October 1998, the NAC, itself divided and receiving no clear mandate from 
the UN Security Councilor from the OSCE, authorized air strikes on Yugoslav 
forces and positions in Kosovo. Military action was averted when Slobodan 
Milosevic then agreed to voluntarily withdraw his forces 
66 Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 
Joint Staff, February 1995) VI-1. a. Alliance: a formal agreement between to 
or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. b. Coalition: an ad hoc 
arrangement between two or more nations for common action 
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the strengths of the Atlantic Alliance. It provides a key 
element in a coherent crisis management strategy that could 
make assessment of the possible military options 
complementary to diplomatic efforts. In the past, military 
options have been presented as alternatives, rather than 
complements to diplomatic initiatives. A credible threat 
of force will be required to negotiate a settlement to a 
crisis as well as enforcement of its terms. 
E. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
As Lord Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO is 
credited with saying the aim of the Atlantic Alliance "was 
to keep the Soviets out, the Germans down, and the 
Americans in." Following the Cold War, the Alliance has 
reoriented its policies from ensuring the collective 
defense of its members to enhancing their collective 
security. Accordingly, the Alliance maintains four 
fundamental principles: 
• The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose 
• Security is indivisible. An attack on one member is 
considered an attack upon all 
• NATO's security policy is based on collective 
defense, including an integrated military structure 
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• The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and 
conventional forces is required67 
NATO's Strategic Concept, released in November 1991, 
reflected the maintenance of the core guarantees along with 
acknowledgment of changes in European security in a post-
Cold War era. The Strategic Concept addresses the fact 
that the Alliance no longer confronts a massive, specific 
foe and extends security beyond traditional borders to 
unspecified risks. "Alliance security interests can be 
affected by other risks of a wider nature, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of 
the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and 
sabotage. "68 Furthermore, the Concept recognizes that 
security is based on political, economic, social, and 
environmental considerations as well as defense. Thus, the 
Concept seeks to achieve the Alliance's long standing 
objectives by political means, in keeping wi th the 
undertakings made in Articles II and IV of the North 
Atlantic Treaty.69 
67 NATO Handbook, 41 
68 NATO Press Conununique S-1(91)85, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, W 7 
November 1991, paragraph 13 
69 NATO Handbook, 41 
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The cornerstone of effective security relationships is 
the fair and equitable sharing of mutual responsibilities 
and proper balance of costs and benefits. The European 
Allies contribute significantly militarily, politically, 
and economically. NATO's common funded budgets have long 
"been unique instruments for achieving defense objectives 
while reducing each country's costs through economies of 
scale and development of joint projects. 1170 The common-
funded budgets are a dramatic example of the multiplier 
effect provided by NATO membership, which allows cost 
saving, coordinated actions by the 16 member states. 
1. NATO's Legal and Moral Authority 
The United Nations Charter does not define 
peacekeeping, but Chapter VI provides for pacific 
settlement of disputes. The Security Council is empowered 
to calIon parties to settle disputes and further empowered 
by Article 34 to investigate any dispute and make 
recommendations to the parties for dispute resolution. The 
Security Council is forbidden to intervene in matters that 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
70 William Cohen, "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A 
Report to the United States Congress by Secretary of Defense," March 1997: 6 
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sovereign state. In other words, moral pressure is brought 
to bear, but not enforcement. 
The Security Council was given in Article 42, however, 
the use of armed forces "to maintain or restore 
international peace and security." The intention was an 
enforcement system determined by a unanimous Security 
Council, which was short-circuited by the divisions of the 
Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the veto power of 
the Permanent Members of the Security Council has not been 
used, resulting in resolutions condemning aggression 
(Iraq), providing for humanitarian relief (Somalia), and 
peacekeeping (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Authorized in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is the 
right for regional security institutions to exist, forming 
the bedrock of legitimacy for the existence of NATO. 
Providing collective defense in the face of a specific foe 
did not require Security Council approval, but to carry out 
the "out of area" and "non-Article V,,71 operations, the 
71 Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states: The Parties agree that an 
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area. Non-article V operations refer to actions 
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Alliance needs to look to international institutions such 
as "the UN Security Council and the OSCE-which have a 
special role to play in providing legitimacy for collective 
military actions. "72 
Thus, legal framework exists to allow for NATO to 
expand its mission from collective defense to collective 
security-casting its gaze to security of the entire region, 
rather than its members. The issue of when and how non-
article V missions, such as peacekeeping, would be employed 
was decided at the 1994 Brussels Summit. General 
principles were adopted that dictated peacekeeping can only 
be carried out under the authority of the UN or the OSCE, 
with exceptions based on Article VII73 of the Charter by the 
UN Security Council. 74 
An example of this exception occurred with Kosovo in 
October 1998. UN Security Council resolutions 1069 and 
taken not in self-defense, but of offensive maneuvers outside traditional 
Alliance borders 
72 Dr. Javier Solana, "Collective Security and the Post-Cold War World," speech 
at the Conference on Crisis Management and NATO Reform, Rome, 15 June 1998 
73 Chapter VII permits regional security organizations to respond with force to 
"threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression" 
74 General Principles on Peacekeeping were developed by the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council's Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping which met in Athens, 11 June 
1993 [Communique M-NACC-1(93)40]. "Peacekeeping can be carried out only under 
the authority of the UN Security Council, or of the CSCE [OSCE] in accordance 
with the CSCE Document agreed in Helsinki in July 1992" 
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1199, vague denouncements calling for the end of fighting 
in that region, were used as moral justification for the 
NAC's authorization of NATO air strikes to remove 
Yugoslavian forces from their siege of Kosovo. The UN 
Security Council, under threat of veto from Russia, was 
unable to pass a resolution ordering Milosevic out of 
Kosovo. Though NATO did not receive moral authority from 
the UN to act, the NAC possessed legal authority for out-
of-area air strikes defined as peace-enforcement. 75 The 
problem accompanying the lack of international consensus is 
inherent in NATO delays and divisiveness over this issue. 
Nevertheless, NATO has political, legal, and military 
authority for conduct of non-Article V missions. Defined 
by MC 327 as "Peace Support Operations," the document lists 
six missions: 
• Conflict Prevention 
• Peacemaking 
• Peacekeeping 
• Humanitarian Aid 
• Peace Enforcement 
75 NATO Communique M-NACC-l(93)40: 2. Peace enforcement: action under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of 
conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-State conflict or with 




2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue 
NATO has been forced to change its approach to the 
Mediterranean due to the end of the Cold War. The Alliance 
responded with a Mediterranean initiative77 that has three 
major objectives: 
• to contribute to security and stability in the 
Mediterranean 
• to promote mutual understanding among NATO and the 
countries of the Mediterranean 
• to counteract misperceptions of the Alliance78 
Since the main problems of the region are economic, 
social, and political, it seems odd that a military 
organization could affect much. Though the EU may play the 
primary role in the region, NATO cannot ignore the 
Mediterranean and must accompany the outreach to the East 
with an outreach to the South. NATO is viewed with 
76 MC 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations. 
77 First mentioned in NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(93)38 in June 1993, the 
Mediterranean Dialogue stated the their readiness to establish contacts on a 
case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member 
countries, with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional 
stability. On 8 February 1995, the NAC, in Permanent Session, decided to 
initiate a direct dialogue with Mediterranean non-member countries 
78 Larrabee and Thorson, 25 
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mistrust in the countries of the Maghreb and should 
initiate any outreach as exploratory. Some ou treach 
measures include: public information, civil emergency 
planning, crisis management, and peace support operations79 . 
Simul taneously, the region is a source of instability and 
unpredictability. Any foray into Mediterranean security 
must be accompanied with a fear that engagement of one of 
the Mediterranean Dialogue partners-Egypt, Israel, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia-may also result in 
conflict with one of the regimes hostile to the West. 
NATO has adopted a broad approach to security, 
defining it more comprehensively than as a response to 
military risks. Issues such as proliferation of WMD, 
chemical and biological weapons, and medium range missiles 
all have direct implications on European security. It is 
NATO's strategy to improve cooperation with its Dialogue 
Partners in a preventive discourse,so while maintaining the 
military strength to affect the nations if diplomatic means 
fail. The 1998 Luxembourg Summit reiterated the Alliance's 
belief "that security in Europe is closely linked with 
79 de Santis, 35 
SO This discourse is in the form of dialogue. NATO's 16 have one unified 
position with which discussions are centered. There is no "conference style" 
negotiations with many differing opinions 
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security and stability in the Mediterranean, which is part 
of the Alliance's overall cooperative approach to security 
and reinforces and complements other international 
efforts. "81 
3. Reaction Forces 
Protecting European security interests implies that 
the Alliance must be prepared to operate outside the 
traditional NATO Treaty area, such as the Mediterranean as 
a whole. 82 However, the core guarantees reiterated in the 
Strategic Concept necessitate a military capability 
sufficient to prevent war, provide for effective defense, 
and manage crises affecting security of its members. 
Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces, 
main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction 
forces (Figure 3-1) consist of Immediate Reaction Forces 
(IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). IRF forces can be 
deployed in three to seven days and include the ACE (Allied 
Command Europe) Mobile Force (AMF)-Land and Air and 
81 NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (98)59, 6 
82 The Mediterranean, bordered by five member states, has always been included 
in NATO's treaty area. In fact, VADM Forrest Sherman called it in 1947 the 
"decisive theater of war." Operating outside the treaty area refers to nations 
on the other side of the Sea, such as the Maghreb, former Warsaw Pact 
countries, and the Middle East 
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Rapid Reaction Forces are deployable in seven to 
fifteen days and contain air, sea, and land elements. Air 
and maritime elements beyond those available will be 
provided by nations on an as-required basis. Land forces 
will come from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The 
Commander ARRC can draw from a pool of national units from 
up to ten divisions whose composition will be depend on the 
missions, terrain, and forces available. 
ACE Reaction Forces are a visible demonstration of 
NATO's cohesion and can facilitate the timely build-up of 
forces in a crisis area. They may be employed ei ther 
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alone, as part of "joint operations" (with one or more 
other components i.e. Maritime, Land or Air forces), in 
"combined operations" (in conjunction with other national, 
NATO or international forces in the theatre of operations), 
or with a mixture of both in "combined joint operations."B3 
4. Combined Joint Task Force 
The 1996 Berlin Summit ratified two measures needed to 
make the Alliance more effective and flexible. First, it 
was agreed that developing ESDI within NATO would 
strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. Secondly, 
the Summit endorsed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
concept as a means of facilitating the use of NATO 
capabilities for European/WEU operations. Introduced as an 
idea following the success of the United States in the Gulf 
War, the CJTF initiative re-vamps NATO's military in order 
to keep it relevant in an era where crisis response is in 
greater demand than territorial defense. "The CJTF concept 
will be the keystone . and be the unifying concept for 
enabling the Alliance to respond and organize for both 
collective defense and 'new' mission requirements."B4 
83 NATO Handbook, 161 
84 William Cohen, "Shaping NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century." 
SecDef Remarks to the Defense Planning Committee, 11 June 1998 
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What is unique about NATO's CJTF concept is that it 
will permanently institutionalize the multinational task 
force concept, which has always been a temporary command 
and control arrangement employed for crisis response by 
alliances or ad hoc coalitions. The concept is a hybrid 
capability that combines the best attributes of both 
coali tion and alliance forces, i. e. rapid crisis response 
by highly ready multinational forces, backed by pre-
established political terms of reference, standardized 
procedures, regular exercises, and in-place 
infrastructure. 8s The stated aims of the CJTF concept are: 
to adapt NATO's force structure for new missions; to 
project security and stability towards the East by offering 
partner states a way to join NATO crisis response; and to 
support ESDI for offering the WEU a "separable but not 
separate" military capability. In sum, CJTF can draw from 
NATO's military structure as well as from PfP partner 
countries to make it "possible for headquarters and other 
assets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be 
transferred, under very special circumstances, for the use 
of the Western European Union, without American engagement 
8S Charles L. Barry, "The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept,· Command in 
NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations 
ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
1997) 30 
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directly through NATO, but under Western European Union 
command. "86 The CJTF concept would provide an always-ready 
capability for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 
humanitarian relief, and other operations called for under 
the Strategic Concept. 
F. ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS 
Without the US, NATO's maritime dimension in the 
Mediterranean is structurally undeveloped and politically 
disordered. Without the unifying presence of the US Navy, 
NATO would not have an effectual amphibious dimension in 
the Mediterranean. 87 Only the US can cut through the 
political Gordian knot of European military planning, and 
that leadership comes through the North Atlantic Alliance. 
It is clear that only NATO, through the United States' 
leadership, can unite the maritime powers of the Alliance 
and establish an effective chain of command and military 
structure. 
Changes initiated by the Alliance during the past 
decade reflect the new paradigm that "the political role of 
86 Robert E. Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, Superintendent's Guest Lecture 
Address to the Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA, 5 Aug 1997 
87 Robert S. Jordan, Alliance Strategy and Navies (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1990) 149 
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the Alliance has to some extent taken precedence over the 
military role. 1188 American influence in Europe reflects the 
reality of unparalleled means for satellite and remote 
observation, intelligence gathering, communications, 
transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence, and effective 
air-land action. Europe will not be able to achieve 
military parity with the US without substantial effort and 
cost, and will have to balance the transatlantic Alliance 
wi th multinational military formations 
economic leadership by the EU. 
and political-
The development of combined, standing amphibious 
concept under NATO is a desire to share the European 
security burden in times when a European-led force would be 
the mos t appropr ia te . Regional security, however, should 
not be tied to one organizational response, and the 
prevailing post-Maastricht attitude concurs with a multi-
dimensional response entity from a variety of institutions 
working with the North American partners to respond to an 
unpredictable environment. 
88 de Puig, 7 
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IV. MEETING AMPHIBIOUS REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
with the exception of the US Navy, Western naval force 
cannot operate across the full range of military missions, 
e.g. amphibious warfare, mine countermeasures, and air 
operations. A single European navy cannot afford to cope 
with a crisis on its own-broader political and military 
leverage is needed. Thus, the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is the 
operational template from which a standing amphibious force 
in Europe should be compared against. 
This chapter will compare the amphibious capabilities 
of NATO, WEU, and PfP nations that possess amphibious 
capabilities against the amphibious capability of the 
United States Navy and Marine Corps. American supremacy in 
amphibious doctrine, practices, and equipment make the 
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) a natural model by which to 
measure the capabilities of a potential European amphibious 
force. After a brief description of the ARG , individual 
countries will be examined, followed by bilateral and 
multilateral amphibious initiatives. 
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A. UNITED STATES 
Highlighting American force projection in the 
Mediterranean is the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). At 
this time, only the US Navy and the US Marine Corps can 
boast the full spectrum of amphibious assets from which to 
launch a Marine Expeditionary Force against an opposed 
shoreline. The ARG is built around one "big deck" 
amphibious assault ship. Commissioned between 1976 and 
1980, five Tarawa-class (LHA) assault ships offer an over-
the-horizon capability via heliborne insertion, aquatic 
entry with Amphibious Assault Vehicles, or both. Six Wasp-
class (LHD) ships have been commissioned since 1989. The 
LHD is capable of transporting 2100 troops and their 
equipment, with vehicle storage for five M1 tanks, 25 LAVs, 
eight M198 guns, 68 trucks, and a number of service 
vehicles. The ship's dock can accommodate. up to three 
Landing Crafts Air Cushioned (LCACs) while the flight deck 
can carry twelve CH-46 helicopters, four CH-53Es, and six 
AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft. 89 
Each forward-deployed ARG-wi th an embarked force of 
just over 3,000 Marines-will eventually be comprised of 
89 Vincent Grimes, Richard Scott and Mike Wells, "Amphibious Advancement." 
Jane's Navy International, 1 September 1997: 23 
70 
three ships; an LHA/LHD assault ship; an LSD 41/49 dock 
landing ship, and an LPD 17 amphibious transport dock 
(being procured in 2002).90 Aegis-equipped cruisers and 
destroyers will be deployed with the ARG, enhancing air 
defense and self-sufficiency. The Mar ine ARG responds to 
the perils that threaten not only American lives and 
interests, but also those of our European Allies. 
B. :ITALY 
La Marina Militare Italiana (MMI) recognizes a wide 
strategic interest to sail beyond the boundaries of the 
Mare Nostrum. Low-intensity tasks have come to 
characterize the MMI' s operations in recent years. with 
the political situation in Albania deteriorating in spring 
1997, Italy led a coalition protection mission, Operation 
ALBA,91 which the MMI provided transport and escort assets. 
The San Marco Amphibious Battalion has evolved from a 
reinforced company to a landing battalion now 900 marines 
strong. When combined with the Army's Amphibious Assault 
Regiment (a Joint Amphibious Brigade) overall strength 
90 Grimes, et al., 24 
91 ALBA was not the first deployment of Italian troops to Albania. Operation 
PELICAN deployed 6000 soldiers in a humanitarian assistance mission from 
September 1991 to December 1993 following the collapse of the communist regime 
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increases to 2,000 men. 92 Considerable money has been 
allocated to amphibious operations and the procurement of 
US AAV-7AI amphibious assault vehicles, armored vehicles, 
and RIB raider boats will provide a significant increase in 
forcible entry capability. 
Amphibious shipping consists of the three San Marco-
class LPDs, each capable of carrying 400 combat-loaded 
Marines plus 30 APCs or 30 medium tanks. However, one of 
the shortcomings of this design is "the reduced helicopter 
component, which is too small to properly cover both 
vertical lift assault and fire support roles. "93 The MMI 
would be forced to risk its sole carrier relatively close 
to shore, in order to provide aviation assets. The carrier 
Giuseppe Garibaldi can provide C2 functions and both rotary 
and fixed-wing aviation assets, but would have little room 
for additional troops. 
To meet this shortfall as well as alliance commitments 
and national missions, a new "big deck" amphibious ship was 
needed. This carrier, named the Luigi Einaudi,94 is 
92 Grimes et al., 30 
93 Paolo Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces. H 
International Defense Review, 1 July 1998: 43 
94 Luigi Einaudi was Italy's first president after World War II 
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"strongly reminiscent of a scaled-down Wasp-class LHD. "95 
Luigi Einaudi can accommodate various aircraft/vehicle 
mixes to include up to 8 helicopters, 80 vehicles, and 6 
AV-8Bs. The ship will be capable of carrying 625 combat 
equipped Marines and will enter service around 2005. 96 
C. FRANCE 
The French Army is undergoing a significant 
reorganization which will comprise of 15 brigades 97 
organized around five task force headquarters tailored for 
crisis response. The Army's 9th Division d'Infanterie 
Marine and 6th Light Armored Division are allocated to 
amphibious operations. 98 9 th Division has been deployed 
overseas on a regular basis, including Somalia, Cambodia, 
Bosnia, and Rwanda. It will currently responsible for 
maintaining amphibious skills, but upon reorganization, all 
units will conduct amphibious training. The French 
Ambassador to the United States, Francois Bujon 
95 Alcibiades Thalassocrates, "Luigi Einaudi: A New Carrier Concept for the 
Italian Navy." Military Technology, March 1988: 81 
96 Thalassocrates, 81 
de 
97 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 44, The reorganization will consist 
of 8 maneuver brigades and 7 combat support and combat service support brigades 
98 Grimes et al., 28 
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l'Estang, stated in April 1998 that, "the overhaul of 
French armed forces will enable them to proj ect more than 
50,000 troops in a major engagement and 100 combat aircraft 
as well as an aircraft carrier task force. "99 
The core amphibious shipping force currently consists 
of three Transport de Chalands de Debarquement (TCD) 
vessels ( equivalent to an LSD). A new TCD, the Siroco, 
entered service in 1998 and is the second in the Foudre-
class (commissioned in 1990). The Foudre has been designed 
to transport, land, and support a mechanized armored 
regiment. It can embark 467 combat-loaded troops, 
accommodate ten LCUs in its well deck, and four helicopters 
on the flight deck. 100 
Smaller vessels include two Ouragan-class LSDs, 
capable of transporting 343 combat troops and four Super 
Puma helicopters. The Ouragan-class, commissioned in the 
~ate 1960s, is due to be replaced shortly after 2002. One 
Bouganville-class LPD can carry 500 troops for eight days, 
and performs in the amphibious role wi th two LCUs and two 
helicopter spots. Five Batral-type LSTs were commissioned 
from 1974 to 1987. Each is capable of transporting 138 
99 Francois Bujon de l'Estang, "Steadfast Allies: 'Real Partnership' Doesn't 
Preclude Contrasting Views." Armed Forces Journal International, April 1998: 52 
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troops but unable to perform strict amphibious operations 
due to a limited flight deck and absence of a well deck.101 
The 9th Division has deployed on French aircraft 
carriers, to support amphibious assault or other "From the 
Sea" operations. 102 Even without deploying an aircraft 
carrier, the French capability to carry out heliborne 
assault or NEOs from the sea will be considerably increased 
through the deployment of the Tiger helicopter and the 
advantages of the Foudre and Siroco landing ships. 
D. UNITED KINGDOM 
The UK's amphibious forces have survived the 
downsizing suffered by much of the world's conventional 
forces due to a transition to an expeditionary doctrine 
with joint and combined operations at its core .103 
Rejuvenation of UK's amphibious shipping centers on 
acquisition of a "big deck" helicopter assault carrier 
(LPH) and two new LPD ships. The LPH Ocean is due to 
100 Grimes et al., 28 
101 Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-98, Amphibious Forces supplement, 25 
102 "French Carrier for Crisis Force." Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 October 1996: 
5. The Clemenceau here was assigned as to EUROMARFOR as a dedicated amphibious 
assault platform for six months. A different carrier will be designated FAWEU 
and assigned to EUROMARFOR on a rotational basis 
103 Grimes et al., 27 
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become operational in early 1999, while the new LPDs, 
Albion and Bulwark, are due in 2002 and 2003 
respectively. 104 Ocean will be capable of transporting a 
full Commando battalion (500 landing troops), plus overload 
for a further 303 and will provide the Royal Navy with a 
dedicated aviation platform from which to embark and 
support 12 medium-lift helicopters. It will also be able 
capable of transporting all vehicles, equipment and stores 
for the commando unit via hovercraft or LCVP. Until Ocean 
comes on line, one of the three Invincible-class carriers 
(CV) has been periodically tasked as an LPH during 
exercises. Invincible and Illustrious10S are currently 
operational, while Ark Royal is laid up in refit. 
The Fearless and Intrepid class LPDs have lift 
capability for 380 troops with overload of 1,000. These 
1960s-era ships can accommodate 15 MBTs, 30 other vehicles, 
and four medium helicopters. Both LPDs are in reserve, 
though regularly maintained, and stand at 30-day readiness 
until the new LPDs are in service. 106 The Albion-class LPD 
will have accommodations for an embarked force of 305 
104 Grimes et al., 26 
105 The 1998 Strategic Defence Review recommends the refit of existing carriers 
and purchase of two new carriers to increase UK's power projection capability 
106 Jane's 1997-98, 34 
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marines, with capacity for 710 in an overload condition. 
The new LPDs will house up to 67 support vehicles, four 
LCUs, four LCVPs, and a platform for two heavy 
helicopters .107 
HMS Ocean and two LPDs will form the core of the Royal 
Navy's newly revived Amphibious Squadron. 108 The squadron 
will be further bolstered by the attachment of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy's new amphibious ship, HrMS Rotterdam, as 
part of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Group (UKNLPHIBGRU). 
A United Kingdom amphibious group consists of a "big deck" 
1 ike HMS Fearless and three LSLs. OCEAN WAVE ' 97 was 
deployed to the Asian Pacific to the lay the groundwork for 
a UK amphibious ready group that "is very much seen as 
'blazing the trail' for the [HMS] Ocean era. "109 
E. NETHERLANDS 
Like Britain, ·the Netherlands Royal Marines are 
maintaining their force level, despite cutbacks for the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Royal Netherlands Marine 
Corps (RNLMC) consists of four Marine battalions: one 
107 Jane's 1997-98, 34 
108 The UK's Amphibious Squadron was disbanded in 1966 
109 Grimes, et aI, 29 
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attached to the UK/NL Amphibious Force; one earmarked for 
NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Land Force (AMF-Land); 
one in the Netherlands Antilles; and one (partly mobilized) 
held in reserve. 110 To the UKNLPHIBGRU, the Dutch 
contribute the 1st Battalion Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 
a landing craft detachment, 7th Netherlands Special Boat 
Squadron, and other task-organized combat and combat 
service support elements. 111 
Until the introduction of HrMS Rotterdam in 1998, the 
RNLMC lacked dedicated organic amphibious lift and was 
forced to rely on UK ships or Ships Taken Up From Trade 
(STUFT) vessels. Rotterdam, similar to an LPD, has been 
built to embark an entire Marine battalion (611 troops), 30 
Leopard 2 tanks or 90 armored fighting vehicles, four 
EH101s or Sea Kings, or six NH-90s or AH-64 Apaches. The 
well deck can accommodate four LCUs, six LCAs, or two LCACs 
(at the expense of vehicle space) . 
F. SPAIN 
The Spanish Amphibious Force was restructured in 
February 1996 to streamline internal command and control 
110 Grimes et al., 30 
111 Steve Mitchell, "Gators on the Other Side of the Pond. N u.s. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, November 1997: 77 
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and improve bilateral cooperation with Italy in the 
formation of the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (S.IAF). 
Grupo Del ta, the marine amphibious component, consists of 
an all-volunteer amphibious brigade (BRIMAR) of over 3500 
marines (4000 by 2004) .112 With the acquisition of AAV7A1 
and the formation of landing vehicle and rigid raider 
companies, 
operations. 
BRIMAR will be capable of forcible entry 
Of the 4000 marines in Grupo Delta, 3000 can 
directly support an amphibious landing. 
The Spanish amphibious group is currently in the 
process of modernizing its amphibious shipping. In 
addition to the acquisition of two former US Navy Newport-
class LSTs in 1994 and 1995, the new LPD, Galicia, has 
become the centerpiece of Grupo Del ta. Commissioned in 
April 1998, Galicia is designed to transport over 600 
combat loaded marines, 170 armored personnel carriers or 33 
main battle tanks .113 Its well deck can accommodate up to 
six landing craft while the hanger and flight deck can 
accommodate up to six medium size helicopters. 114 The 
Principe de Asturias aircraft carrier adds a further 
112 Va1po1ini, "Mediterranean Partnership.H 41 
113 Jane's 1997-98, 30 
114 Grimes et a1., 32 
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support dimension to amphibious operations with its AV-8B 
Harr:ier II, C4I, and helicopter transport capability. A 
second LPD is planned to replace the aging attack transport 
(LPA) ships Castilla and Aragon, which remain in service 
since transfer from the US Navy in 1980. Each Paul Revere-
class LPA is capable of transporting 1657 troops, but these 
can be put ashore only by using landing craft moored 
alongside the ship. 
G. TURKEY 
Though Turkey must split its assets among three areas 
of interest-the Aegean in the west, the Mediterranean to 
the south, and the Black Sea to the north, its amphibious 
priori ties are also mostly local. The 1st Naval Infantry 
Brigade, the Amfibi Deniz Piyade, numbers 3100 men. 115 The 
brigade consists of three amphibious battalions and a 
support battalion. 
Turkish amphibious ships, all LST type, have an 
overall transport capabi I i ty of 3300 troops, 50 MBTs, and 
other vehicles and heavy equipment. 116 The fleet is 
completed by 60 landing craft of various dimensions 
115 Eric Grove, "Rise and Fall--A New Order in the Black Sea. H Jane's Navy 
International, 1 March 1998: 32 
116 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership.H 28 
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exceeding the strength of the amphibious force. The LST 
Osman Gazi was commissioned in 1994 and is capable of 
carrying 900 combat loaded troops, 15 tanks, 4 medium 
landing craft i and one large helicopter. Other Turkish 
amphibious ships consist of two US LSTs, two Sarucabey-
class LSTs, and a number of heavy landing craft capable of 
carrying up to 100 troops and five tanks.117 The lack of c4r 
assets, however, does not allow Turkey to assume the role 
of Combined Commander Amphibious Task Force (CCATF). 
H. GREECE 
Greece's amphibious priorities are to ensure the 
safety of its 3, 000 islands. Greek amphibious force is 
comprised of navy assets for transport and army assets for 
the landing force. The Greek 32nd Marine Brigade, composed 
of three maneuver battalions with combat support, is the 
result of a conscious attempt to create an organization 
with improved amphibious capabilities .118 The amphibious 
forces, also trained for NEOs and humanitarian assistance, 
have gained experience through the implementation of the 
multinational training. 
117 Jane's 1997-98, 33 
118 B1averis Leonidas, "Greece - Forces Change Course as Old Rivalries Flare. n 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 November 1997: 32 
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Five new Jason-class LSTs have been acquired to 
replace older vessels, six former US Navy LSTs built in the 
1940s and 1950s. Three ships, Samos, Chios, and Ikara, are 
in service, with the remaining becoming operational by 
2000. Each ship can host up to 300 soldiers, has a roll-
on, roll-off configuration, and a hanger to enable use of 
medium size helicopters from the aft flight deck. Although 
the use of attack and transport helicopters during 
amphibious operations is part of Greek doctrine, the 
procedures for employing gunships are still being developed 
after the receipt of 12 AH-64 Apaches a few years ago. 119 
The Greek Navy does not possess adequate causeways 
and cannot put MBTs and other heavy equipment ashore 
without a port facility. The navy will remedy this 
deficiency with an acquisition in 1999 of six air cushioned 
amphibious craft that will have a load capacity of 150 
tons. 120 Additionally, the navy does not possess a command 
ship and thus, is not capable of acting as CCATF. 
119 Valpolini. "Mediterranean Partnership." 55 
120 Valpolini. "Mediterranean Partnership." 55 
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I . PORTUGAL 
The Portuguese Fuzileiros are acquiring a logistic 
transport ship with the capability to protect and sustain 
their forces ashore. Although significant organizational 
changes have streamlined their conunand and control, the 
Portuguese Navy consists of only three Bombarda-class 
LCT/LDGs. Contributions to a NATO amphibious force come in 
the form of manpower, conventional surface ships, and 
political support. Portugal is a member of EUROMARFOR and 
has designated a frigate to the WEU-Ied response corps. 
In early 1998, the Portuguese government began a five-
year plan to acquire helicopters, aircraft, improvement in 
conunand and control, and ships. 121 The navy has plans to 
upgrade its amphibious fleet with the acquisition of a 
mUlti-purpose amphibious/logistics ship capable of combat 
flight operations. 
J. PFP NATIONS 
1. Romania 
Poor relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War led to erratic supplies of equipment and extreme 
121 Ade Clewlow, "Portugal Paves Way for Force Modernization. H Jane's Defence 





in maintaining the Romanian fleet. 
readiness was sacrificed by Ceausescu' s 
that naval personnel participate in the 
dictator's projects ashore. When the economy failed, naval 
acquisition and refits halted until the early 1990s. 
The Romanian Navy consists of one destroyer, six 
frigates, patrol vessels, a lone Kilo-class submarine, and 
a riverine force of 2 0 river monitors. Finding personnel 
to operate the ships is difficult, as nearly half the 
navy" s strength of 17, SOO-over 50 per cent conscripted-is 
accounted by the naval infantry corps of 8,000. 122 
Unfortunately, there are no amphibious ships to transport 
the corps. 
Although Romania can impressively deploy a few major 
combatants of limited capability at a distance-thus, the 
ability to take part in multinational exercises-it is a 
long way from deploying a NATO-style fleet. Romania needs 
dedication of resources and must achieve interoperability 
with western forces prior to serious consideration by NATO 
in a Mediterranean amphibious force. 
122 Grove, "Rise and Fall." 38 
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2. Bulgaria 
The Bulgarian Navy hopes to complete an ambitious 
restructuring by the year 2000. Al though it calls for a 
reduction in ships, the plan sets an operational goal of 
one Romeo-class submarine, one Koni-class small frigate, 6 
corvettes with ASW capabilities, and numerous patrol boats, 
torpedo boats, and riverine craft. Twenty mine-warfare 
vessels are planned along with twelve minelayers from 
converted amphibious ships. The planned naval aviation 
element will comprise of twelve land-based helicopters. 123 
Bulgaria can offer nothing to a combined Mediterranean 
amphibious force. The fleet is generally a coastal patrol 
and defense force and possesses no capability for power 
projection. Although a nominal force of 2,000 naval 
infantry exists, they are tasked mainly with guard duties 
and seldom conduct training in amphibious operations. Only 
two Polnochny-class vessels are available for use as 
transports with no plans to build additional amphibious 
shipping at this time. 
123 Grove, "Rise and Fall." 39 
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K. BI-LATERAL RESPONSES TO THE AMPHIBIOUS NEED 
1. Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) 
Italy and Spain have amphibious forces of similar size 
and organizational structure, and both operate with their 
amphibious forces within NATO and the WEU. Based on these 
similari ties, the Spanish- Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) 
was created in September 1996. 'wi th the SIAF, \\ Italy and 
Spain will provide, together with the US ARG and the 
UKNLPHIBGRU, a force of a clearly Mediterranean nature and 
with a higher capability than the force that would result 
if each country contributed with its forces separately. 11124 
The use of similar operational procedures and the 
interoperabili ty of assets enable a smooth integration of 
respective units. The complementary character of naval and 
landing units of both nations will result in a force 
,greater than the sum of its parts and subsequently a more 
effective fighting unit. 
The creation of SIAF does not imply any permanent 
stationing of forces other than their national bases. SIAF 
components will be Grupo Del ta and Tercio de Armada (3 rd 
Fleet) on the Spanish side; Terza Divisione Navale (3 rd 
124 "Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).N XIV Spanish/USA Navy Staff 
Talks, date unknown, Topic 13 
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Naval Division) and Battaglione San Marco on the Italian 
side. The force will be activated on-call and act within a 
bilateral framework established in the concept of 
Operations. Within multilateral operations, the force 
would be integrated in CAFMED or EUROMARFOR, which would 
provide the support means. 
Exchanging commissioned and noncommissioned officers, 
permanently assigned to the host country, will integrate 
staffs. Command will change each year with one country 
providing both the CATF and the CLF. The CATF will be 
either the Italian 3rd Division rear admiral or the Spanish 
Grupo Del ta commanding admiral, while the CLF will be the 
San Marco Battaglione CO or the Spanish 3rd Fleet's 
executive officer. 
2. United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Task Group 
Building on a relationship dating back to 1972, the 







formation of the UK-
Group (UKNLPHIBGRU) . 
Originally created to operate in the mountain and cold 
weather conditions of NATO's northern region in Norway, the 
Amphibious Group now primarily trains and operates in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
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The Task Group integrates one battalion of the Royal 
Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) within Three Commando 
Brigade of the UK Royal Marines. The Landing Force is a 
brigade-size unit over 4500, consisting of a headquarters, 
three ground maneuver units, and supported by combat 
engineers and logistic units, mortars, antitank and air 
defense weapons, helicopter aviation, reconnaissance sub 
units, and artillery.125 The two Marine Corps have 
pioneered the multinational concept within NATO and are 
"interrelated and can work together, and have been doing so 
for 25 years. 11126 
The Dutch LPD Rotterdam fills a critical 
transportation and logistic shortfall in the bilateral 
force. The remaining vessels are provided by the United 
Kingdom and consist of the LHA Ocean, LPDs Fearless and 
Intrepid or LSLs, and support ships providing landing 
support logistics from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. With the 
replacement of the LPDs in 2000 and 2002, the UKNLPHIBGRU 
will have a versatile and combat group capable of rapid 
125 Mitchell, 75 
126 Ian Kemp, "Assault From the Sea: The Royals Advance.· Jane's Defense 
Weekly, 25 June 1997: 28. Statement from Gen Pennefather, Commandant General 
Royal Marines 
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reaction and force projection within the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean regions. 
Under NATO command structure, Commander UKNLPHIBGRU 
reports to SACLANT as part of NATO's Maritime Rapid 
Reaction Force. In 1993, the British and Dutch government 
formally designated the group FAWEU, as a multinational 
European Force capable of crisis response, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian missions, combat missions, and peacemaking 
operations .127 
L. EXISTING MULTINATIONAL PROPOSALS 
1. History of European Naval Cooperation 
Over the years, NATO provided the means by which 
European navies established a set of cooperative operation 
and communication procedures. The Standing Naval Force 
Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) was created in 1968, followed by 
the Naval On-Call Force Medi terranean in 1969 (re-
designated STANAVFORMED in 1992), the Standing Naval Force 
Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) in 1973, and the Standing Naval 
Mine Counter Measure Force (STANAVMCMFOR) in 1994. These 
forces provided experience of truly combined operations and 
127 These missions were designated by the WEU's Petersberg Declaration of 19 
June 1992. The WEU decided that certain missions of peacekeeping/conflict 
prevention in concert with the CSCE and UN would be a common military activity 
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created a high level of interoperability among dissimilar 
vessels and operating procedures. France has taken part in 
NATO exercises and maintained standards of communication so 
that at the operational level the effects of its separation 
from the alliance were mitigated. 12B These forces are 
\\ immediate reaction forces that will deploy to a crisis 
area in order to establish NATO presence, demonstrate 
solidarity, conduct surveillance, and contain crises. "129 
In the Persian Gulf, a joint WEU operation named CLEAN 
SWEEP, was formed to clear the gulf of mines following the 
Iran-Iraq War. In DESERT SHIELD, the WEU contributed three 
groups of naval assets: a Spanish/Italian/French130 group in 
the Straits of Hormuz; a Belgian/French group around Bab-
el-Mandeb; and a Belgian MCM group. The Uni ted Kingdom 
chose to operate with the American Navy in the north of the 
gulf, opposing an independent WEU command on the grounds 
that the organization lacked an appropriate politico-
military structure. 
Ships acting under the WEU accounted for about two-
thirds of interceptions before the start of DESERT STORM, 
12B Grove, "A European Navy." 44 
129 Michele Cosentino, "Mu1tinationa1ity: The Way Ahead for Western Maritime." 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 199B: 65 
130 The Italian Navy shifted to the US-led force just before DESERT STORM began 
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and put naval activities at the forefront of the 
organization's operational capabilities. This new self-
confidence led to the formation of SHARP FENCE, a maritime 
interdiction force to uphold the sanctions on warring 
parties in the Balkans. Civil war in former Yugoslavia 
also meant the involvement of NATO's naval reaction forces 
(e. g., STANAVFORMED) in the Adriatic in the first actual 
military operations performed since NATO's inception-named 
MARITIME GUARD. Eventually, the duality and inefficiency 
of two discrete commands led to a fully integrated task 
force, renamed SHARP GUARD. The joint NATO/WEU 
headquarters, basically NATO's COMNAVSOUTH with WEU 
officers, controlled Combined Task Force 440. 
2. Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean 
The concept for a Combined Amphibious Force 
Mediterranean (CAFMED) was developed in 1991 by the 
Amphibious Warfare Division at the Striking and Supporting 
Force Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) HQ in Naples, 
Italy.131 The CAFMED concept is the formation of a 
multinational NATO amphibious force in the Mediterranean in 
times of crises or for conflict prevention. CAFMED was 
131 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 28 
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approved in 1995 by SACEAUR and is primarily made up of 
Greek, Italian, Turkish, Spanish, French, and American 
Navies. It could also include non-Mediterranean NATO 
nations such as the UK, the Netherlands, and Portugal. 
CAFMED is not a standing force. It is a framework for 
amphibious forces to operate within and around NATO's 
Southern Region in times of crisis. CAFMED "takes 
advantage of the ability of multinational-national 
amphibious forces, all of whom share a common operational 
mindset, to quickly mesh their planning and operations,,132 
CAFMED offers NATO an additional deterrent or intervention 
capability and can deploy independently under a UN or OSCE 
mandate. CAFMED's mission is "to deploy a brigade size 
landing force which must be self-sustaining for 15 days, 
and supported by adequate naval and naval-air assets. "133 
Its mission spectrum includes deployment as part of high 
intensity operations such as an amphibious assault, as well 
as execution of NEOs and humanitarian missions. 
CAFMED's organizational priori ties concentrate on the 
integration of forces into an enhanced air-ground task 
force. The force can range from a light infantry unit to 
132 Mundy, 62 
133 Valpo1ini, "Mediterranean Partnership.- 28 
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a full brigade with up to five naval infantry battalions 
supported by armor, mortars, an t i-tank weapons, and 
battalion level artillery. Particular emphasis is on the 
development of satellite based c4r and high data-rate 
communications for both amphibious shipping and land 
forces. 
CAFMED is based on the Commander Combined Amphibious 
Task Force (CCATF)/Commander Combined Landing Force (CCLF) 
split of responsibilities. Both posts will be assigned to 
a single country, the respective staffs will be augmented 
by personnel from other participating countries. 134 Despite 
the nationality of the CATF /CLF, English is used during 
operations and planning. 
3. European Maritime Force 
Following successes in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and 
the Adriatic, ongoing reductions of naval. forces are 
forcing a new approach for naval multinationality.135 A 
single navy can neither afford nor impact a crisis on its 
own. These initiatives represent a larger initiative in 
bringing European navies together to respond and 
proactively address distinct Eurocentric crises. However, 
134 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 28 
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the presence of US and NATO officers at these meetings and 
their "observer" role shows that any moves towards a 
"European" navy has been within a NATO context. French 
ideas that the WEU could act as a replacement for NATO 
foundered when faced with the realities of the Gulf and 
Bosnia. Now that France is moving back into the NATO fold, 
it is likely that consensus will be reached on the role of 
the WEU as a useful means of giving European countries the 
mechanisms for taking the lead in lower-level military 
tasks.136 Many of these are tasks for which maritime forces 
are highly suited. 
The European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) was created 
in 1995 with the cooperation of France, Italy, and Spain. 
Portugal was added shortly thereafter. Headquartered in 
Spain, EUROMARFOR parallels the EUROFOR as a European 
formation established separate from NATO. It is to be 
activated under WEU's authority and tasked with a number of 
roles including peacekeeping, crisis management, and 
humanitarian assistance. It will stand up for training and 
exercises, and should a crisis arise, serve as a rapid 
reaction force. Currently commanded by an Italian vice 
135 Cosentino, 66 
136 Grove, "A European Navy." 50 
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admiral,137 EUROMARFOR consists of a 20-vessel fleet built 
around a French aircraft carrier and is trained for 
operations in the Mediterranean. Each nation designates 
ships and units as FAWEU, while still maintaining readiness 
under NATO direction (excepting France) 
Despite the positive aspect of inviting Greece and 
Turkey to joint EUROMARFOR,13B the WEU is still bruised from 
its recent setback over Albania. In 1997 the Members were 
unable to agree on a joint military force to help maintain 
security and protect aid distribution after an insurrection 
against the government. In the end a "coalition of the 
willing" sent forces for three months. "Albania was the 
ideal operation for EUROMARFOR, not too far, not too 
complicated, not too dangerous. "139 
137 Paolo Valpolini. "Reachi~g Out Beyond the Mediterranean." Jane's Navy 
International, 1 March 1998: 19. Italian Navy Vice Adm Umberto Guarnieri 
assumed the post from French Vice Adm Philippe Durteste on 2B October 1997. He 
is also Italian Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces and Commander NATO Naval Forces 
Central Mediterranean. 
13B "Turkey and Greece Can Join Euro Forces in 1999," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 
20 June 199B: 5. The force will comprise 2,000 to 3,000 troops who will be 
based in their home countries. These forces will be available to take part in 
peacekeeping missions led by NATO or the WEU 
139 Bruno Franceschi, "In NATO's Shadow, European Defence Group Looks For a 
Niche," Agence France Presse, 13 May 1997: 42 
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M. CONCLUSIONS 
Although resting primarily with the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Italy, and France, sufficient amphibious capability 
exists among other European nations. Though that 
capability is not fully developed, there is a clear 
indication that the maritime nations of Europe regard 
amphibious operations seriously and have begun investing in 
these resources while reducing conventional ground combat 
forces and structures. 
The more developed amphibious nations have developed a 
competent level of multinational action, such as the 
promising bilateral initiatives of UKNLPHIBGRU and SIAF. 
However, these initiatives along with the multilateral 
concepts of CAFMED and EUROMARFOR are ad hoc and cannot 
meet the need of a flexible, responsive force. 
Expanding on the successful history European maritime 
cooperation (with both WEU and NATO) creates a precedent 
from which a combined force could be constructed. Based on 
evidence of sufficient European amphibious capabilities, 
successful multilateral development, and a defined need for 
a permanent amphibious capability, a NATO combined Standing 
Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean is feasible. 
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V. STAPHIBFORMED CONCEPT 
The Standing Amphibious Force Mediterranean concept 
(STAPHIBFORMED) must achieve a four-fold purpose: 
flexibility, capability, interoperability, and reliability. 
Based on the Strategic Concept and CJTF, NATO will have a 
role in peace support operations. Force structures and 
decision-making mechanisms must provide suitably capable 
forces for deterrence, 
management. 
collective defense, and crisis 
The Standing Force must be flexible enough to respond 
to contingencies promptly. Operations conducted at a 
distance will experience deficiencies in mobility, 
communications, and sustainment, which can become fatal 
impediments to mission success. Development of common 
doctrine, logistics, language, and communication skills are 
necessary for STAPHIFORMED to achieve unity of purpose and 
efficient response to orders. The concept would create 
interoperable forces and qualified staff personnel that 
could be effectively used for peace support operations. 
The permanent structure would streamline the Amphibious 
Force and serve as a breeding ground for distinctly 
"European" military personnel. 
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A. FORCE COMPOSITION 
In actuality, the only permanent component of the 
Standing Amphibious Force concept will be the headquarters. 
Though based on the American ARG, it is unlikely that 
European navies can equal the United States in maintenance, 
logistics, and sustainability. Therefore, forces assigned 
as STAPHIBFORMED will be assigned in four-month increments 
and rotated tri-annually. The following schedule is 
proposed for forces making up STAPHIBFORMED: 
Jan - April UK/NL Amphibious Group 
May - Aug Spanish Italian Amphibious Force 
Sept - Dec French deployment with secondary 
vessels assigned from Greece, Turkey or other140 
These organizations are not standing forces. 
STAPHIBFORMED offers a permanent structure and organization 
that will allow the already existing bilateral forces to 
plan and execute a necessary and needed NATO mission with 
the full support of the Alliance's military. More 
importantly, the STAPHIBFORMED concept provides a unifying 
NATO framework for multilateral action already underway. 
In doing so, this will bring the full power of the Alliance 
140 Forces capable of contributing to the STAPHIBFORMED concept are listed in 
the Appendix 
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(including us assets) to bear in support of the Force's 
credibility. 
It is hoped that France, a key naval power in the 
Mediterranean, will soon rejoin the integrated military 
structure of NATO and take leadership of one-third of the 
Force. Without the aircraft carriers of France, the "big 
deck" capability would be lost, as well as the leadership 
and maritime experience of the French navy. Since it is 
unlikely that the remaining powers, Turkey and Greece, 
would subordinate themselves to each other, much less work 
together, French participation in NATO's military structure 
is imperative in fielding a full-time standing force in the 
Mediterranean. 










institutionalizes the multinational task force, similar to 
both STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED. The Standing Naval 
force was activated on 30 April 1992 to provide a 
continuous maritime presence that is a constant and visible 
reminder of Alliance solidarity. STANAVFORMED, formerly an 
On-Call force, was initiated with the approval of the 
99 
Strategic Concept, which called for a greater role to be 
played by Allied multinational forces. Much of 
STAPHIBFORMED's development of common doctrine, procedures, 
and protocol can be acquired from the standing 
Mediterranean naval force. 
STAPHIBFORMED mirrors the operational concept of the 
CJTF. It can be a NATO-led, NATO plus PfP, or WEU-led 
operation. Although under the NATO chain of command, some 
STAPHIBFORMED forces are FAWEU and could be released for 
assignment to the WEU pending a NAC decision. The 
permanent nature of this force makes its deployability 
immediate, possibly mating up with a CJTF headquarters in 
the theatre of operations. STAPHIBFORMED fits into the 
Strategic Concept, the CJTF concept, and the Ministerial 
Meeting of the NAC in May 1998. The NAC Summit urges: 
The Alliance to maintain military effectiveness for 
the full range of its missions building on its 
essential collective defense capabilities and its 
ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to 
preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the 
European Security and Defense Identity with the 
Alliance .141 
The permanence of STAPHIBFORMED allows the 
establishment of a Standing Headquarters wi thin Regional 
141 NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (98)59, 3 
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Command Sou th (RCSOUTH) that will not take resident 
knowledge "home" when the ad hoc task force is 
discontinued. The accumulation of a ready reservoir of 
military personnel experienced in collective crisis 
response will be a significant by-product. The standing 
nature of the force and the permanence of the HQ will make 
the immediate execution of urgent missions, such as NEOs, 
ini tial disaster relief, and search and rescue possible. 
Political decisions will be facilitated by the existence of 
a standing force with established C2 relationships, 
composition, and ROE. 
The multinational template for executing this variety 
of missions is the CJTF, but the operational template is 
based on the United States Navy's ARG. The ARG mounts 
military operations from the sea on short notice-consisting 
of what the US Navy describes as "forward deployed, self-
sustaining naval forces tailored to achieve a clearly 
stated objective. "142 Just as the American ARG demonstrates 
American "presence, " the European STAPHIBFORMED would 
demonstrate Alliance resolve and unity under the NATO flag. 
Likewise, STAPHIBFORMED will retain the ARG's ability to 
quickly shift operational focus from combat missions to 
142 Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare, 4 
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humanitarian assistance without need to reconfigure the 
force. 
C. MISSIONS 
STAPHIBFORMED would encompass the same peace 
operations (non-Article V operations) that are defined in 
NATO's MC 327 "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support 
Operations" and encompass conflict prevention, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and peace enforcement. WEU 
military missions, found in the 1992 Petersburg 
Declaration, are similar to NATO's MC 327 and include 
humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and peace 
enforcement. The range of military options that 
STAPHIBFORMED is responsible for will run from peacetime 
engagements to deterrence and combat missions (Table 5-1). 
PEACETIME DETERRENCE AND COMBAT MISSIONS 
ENGAGEMENT CONFLICT 
PREVENTION 
Alliance to Crisis Response Decisive Force 
Partner Contacts 
Assistance to Arms Control Power Projection 
Nations 
Peacekeeping Confidence- Combined and Joint 
building measures Warfare 
Humanitarian Non-combatant Counter Weapons of 
Assistance Evacuation (NEO) Mass Destruction 
Sanctions 
Enforcement 
Table 5-1. STAPBXBFORMED Responsibilities 
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A NATO Amphibious Squadron is a visible symbol of 
Alliance presence and, in effect, a NATO trip-wire. While 
under the NATO flag, an attack on Alliance ships would 
constitute nothing less serious than attack on 16-a breach 
of Article V of the Atlantic Charter. However, in 
international waters, STAPHIBFORMED is free of political 
encumbrances that inhibit and limit the scope of land-based 
operations. 
D. PROBLEMS 
While the United States steadfastly refuses to commit 
forces or assets unless they are part of an operation using 
NATO command structure, France has opposed using the NATO 
chain of command in the Medi terranean under an American 
Flag officer at RCSOUTH. France sees a European flag 
officer in NATO's Southern Region as a prerequisite for its 
full return to the NATO integrated military structure. 
France argues that if ESDI is to be developed within NATO 
Europeans should have a larger share of top billets. 
France has also implied that any non-Article V military 
operation would require an "ad hoc" command arrangement 
totally dependent on the number of forces each nation 
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commi ts . 143 This view contradicts the essence of the CJTF 
concept and would render inclusion of France in the 
STAPHIBFORMED proposal problematic, since both proposals 
argue for a dedicated and permanent command structure, 
rather than a provisional HQ. 
The Allies have spurned France's call to turn Southern 
Command over to a European, which has now shelved its 
demand due to lack of support. Says one senior diplomat at 
NATO headquarters: 
The prospective securi ty threats along the 
southern flank make it all the more important to 
keep the Southern command in the hands of an 
American. Bosnia showed us the alliance only 
works when the United States takes the lead, and 
we need to keep the US engaged where the action 
is likely to be. 144 
Still, a strong Allied presence in the Mediterranean 
is impossible without the inclusion of France. An 
.agreeable solution must be made to re-introduce France to 
the integrated military structure of NATO. As the largest 
regional influence in the Mediterranean, an effective 
Allied policy cannot be accomplished without complete 
143 John Borawski, "NATO Restructuring and Enlargement: The Dual Challenge,H 
Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational 
Consideration. ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1996) 206 
144 Drozdiak, A4 
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French involvement: politically, economically, and 
militarily. 
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Despit~ the demonstrated need of a NATO-led, European-
staffed, standing amphibious force, American presence in 
the form of the 6th Fleet, is not likely to diminish in the 
Mediterranean. STAPHIBFORMED must have a complimentary 
role with the United States, rather than developing as a 
substitute for American maritime power. STAPHIBFORMED will 
act in cooperation with the United States as the "European 
response" to a crisis with NATO's approval (and America's 
implied consent). When world events require the 6th Fleet 
to respond to crises, their absence in the Mediterranean 
can be capably filled by STAPHIBFORMED in a supplementary 
role, fulfilling the missions of presence, engagement with 
Allies and Partners, and deterrence. 
The Reaction Forces of Allied Command Europe (ACE) are 
divided into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid 
Reaction Forces (RRF). Under IRF falls ACE Mobile Forces 
(AMF) Land and Air, and IRF Maritime Forces consisting of 
STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORMIN. This force structure 
arrangement falls under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), as shown in Fig~re 5-1, while administrative 
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STAPHIBFORMED FORCE STRUCTURE 
ACE 
SACEUR 




Immediate Rapid Reaction 
Reaction Forces Forces 
I I I AMF (Land) I I AMF (Air) I I SEA ARRC 
[-·····-·--·--------·---------+--I _I 
r-1-=S=TAP-:-==m=B=-'='F=-O=-:R=-ME"""==D:--11 1 STANAVFORMIN I r-I S~T~AN~A~VF~O~R~ME::-=""D""'I 
* Under WEU command (proposed) 
Figure 5-1. STAPHXBFORMED Force Structure 
STAPHIBFORMED COMMAND 
I CINe RC SOUTH I 
I I 
JSRC Land Forces JSRC Land Forces CC Air Forces 
South Southeast South 
I J 
JSRC Land Forces CC Naval Forces JSRC Land Forces 
Southwest South South-central 
I····················································· .......................... J 
ISTAPmBFORMED I STANAVFORMED STANAVFORMIN I 
Figure 5-2. STAPHXBFORMED Command Structure 
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control is delegated to the Component Commander Navy South 
(CCNAVSOUTH) under the Regional Commander South (RCSOUTH), 
as shown in Figure 5-2. 
Once deployed, STAPHIBFORMED would report either 
directly to the Regional Commander (RC) or through CCNAV 
Component Command. In conjunction with the ESDI 
initiative, STAPHIBFORMED fits in this command structure, 
as the CCNAV billet will be filled by an Italian flag 
officer (Figure 5-3). When the North Atlantic Council 
STAPHIBFORMED OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
I SACEUR I 
------.-.--.---.-.--iL._D_S_A_C:-E_UR __ *----' 
I RCSOUTH 
• Under WEU operations, CJTF Commander may report to 
DSACEUR or DSACEUR may assume CJTF command 
I 
I CJTF Commander I 
I I STAPHIBFORMED I 
Figure 5-3. STAPHIBFORMED Operational Control 
approves a mission profile for STAPHIBFORMED, operational 
control would most likely be delegated to a CJTF commander 
under RCSOUTH. The CJTF commander could ei ther be the 
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Commander of the standing CJTF HQ, CCNAV, or assigned to 
the force as circumstances dictate. 145 
It is critical that the STAPHIBFORMED chain of command 
lead clearly back to the Regional Command responsible for 
Article V defense in the region concerned. The sovereignty 
of the Alliance sails with the NATO flag and a non-Article 
V operation could quickly escalate into a defense of 
Alliance forces and material. For a WEU-Ied force, 
procedures to recall a force to NATO control must be 
developed and exercised, since territorial defense is 
considered, even by the WEU, to be executed under Article V 
of the Washington Treaty. 146 
The command relationship must continue to follow 
NATO's time-tested principle of unity of command. 
Coordination among European allies alone has rarely 
produced a viable and effective multinational structure. 
In a standing force rather than an ad hoc task force, day-
145 Command and control issues are a thorny problem of multinational land 
formations. Although multinational aviation and naval forces have worked well 
for years, ground forces are much more complex. Though the topic of 
multinational command and control is only briefly discussed, this thesis is 
sensitive to the inherent problems of national sovereignty, command 
authorities, exercise relationships, and "unity of command." For additional 
information on these problems, see Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young's essay 
"Command Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the Central 
Region's Armies." 
146 Barry, 40 
108 
to-day control will not be under national authorities, but 
under a NATO Strategic Commander. Therefore, wi thin the 
STAPHIBFORMED concept, a single commander will be appointed 
and answer exclusively to the following: 
a) In peacetime: RCSOUTH (through CCNAV) 
b) In combat under NATO: Commander CJTF 
c) In combat under WEU: Commander CJTF 
The STAPHIBFORMED proposal fills a critical niche 
between the land forces of the Rapid Reaction Corps and 
CJTFs. Rapid Reaction Corps will respond to collective 
defense issues of the Alliance, while CJTF will draw on 
available forces to tailor the response to the collective 
security threat. 
standing force, 
STAPHIBFORMED will have a standing HQ and 
ready and available for assignment. 
STAPHIBFORMED may act alone, be the first to arrive in a 
larger CJTF, or act in concert with an ARRC deployment. It 




VI. CONCLOSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this thesis has shown, the Mediterranean is a key 
security concern for the United States and Europe. Absent 
American leadership in NATO, little collective amphibious 
capability exists in the Mediterranean despite the 
reinvigoration of the WEU. Furthermore, global demands, 
Alliance burden sharing, and CFSP/ESDI require the 
multinational support of US forces in the region. The 
first among these is a requirement for a force capable of 
responding on short notice to the likely threat. The 
si tuation requires the presence of a ready, capable force 
to ensure stability. Thus, the proposal for a Standing 
Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean should be adopted by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
A. CONCLOSIONS 
STAPHIBFORMED is a mechanism for crisis response and 
peacekeeping operation conducted beyond Allied borders. A 
European Amphibious Force is intended to facilitate better 
resource sharing between the US and Allies and permit the 
Europeans to undertake some missions without direct US 
involvement. Such arrangements will promote a distinct 
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance 
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and help satisfy the American desire to share the global 
security burden with Europe. 
STAPHIBFORMED is necessary. It is designed to respond 
to non-Article v operations, such as peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement, and 
deterrence of terrorism. As NATO casts its gaze outward, 
there is no shortage of conflict within or on the periphery 
of Europe. Ethnic, religious, and economic tensions create 
instability in many nations of the Maghreb as well as the 
more brutal examples in the Balkans. European prosperity, 
security, and peace depend on assisting these nations to 
become productive members of the international community or 
by being able to deal with unrest when engagement and 
diplomacy fail. Diplomatic resolutions, such as those in 
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, utilize the threat of force 
for two reasons: (1) to compel negotiations; (2) to enforce 
the terms. The attitude of the international community 
will be based on confidence that the military organization 
will be capable of delivering as expected. Thus, the 
greater need for collective security over collective 
defense is best illustrated by a force structure adaptable 
and flexible enough to deal with all ranges of crisis 
response. 
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NATO has undergone a period of transition and 
adaptation in order to focus on its new role in a post-
Soviet Union world. The Strategic Concept has set the tone 
for the Alliance to welcome enlargement, approve new tasks, 
streamline its command structure, and develop new force 
structures capable of a flexible, rapid response. 
Politically, the Alliance has created a synergy with other 
regional organizations that present a European political, 
economic, and military demonstration of unity. 
STAPHIBFORMED seamlessly integrates these objectives as a 
result of its multilateral Alliance composition, display of 
naval "presence" during engagement, and robust and flexible 
capabilities required for crisis response. 
STAPHIBFORMED is capable. Amphibious operations have 
defined naval warfare in the Mediterranean Sea since the 
days of Agamemnon. With all of the Mediterranean and most 
African nations accessible by water, Europe's southern 
security must take on a distinct amphibious dimension. 
History has shown that a capable, well-trained 
expeditionary force can have an immediate impact in regions 
of national interest. Expeditionary forces, being sea-
based, remain a conspicuous and mobile example of national 
or international resolve. While at sea, the Amphibious 
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Ready Group is self-sufficient and politically benign, 
requiring no right of passage while in international 
waters. The amphibious force can simultaneously provide 
naval presence to achieve political objectives and engage 
partners and allies. Thus, the on-site, task organized 
STAPHIBFORMED can perform the critical missions of power 
projection and presence while maintaining the capability to 
respond to a variety of mission requirements, however 
unusual, including forcible entry if necessary. 
STAPHIBFORMED is feasible. Although the Europeans 
cannot put forward an integrated, self-sufficient, force 
with the durability of the United States, the four-month 
rotation cycle makes an annual Mediterranean deployment 
possible for nations involved. Europeans have much of the 
infrastructure of an amphibious force already in place, or 
are expecteq to field it within the next five years. Two-
thirds of STAPHIBFORMED has already been chartered, wi th 
the UK/NL Amphibious Group drawing on 25 years of 
experience and SIAF operational for over two years. French 
participation, key to a year-round capability, is yet to be 
determined. Upon full re-integration into the military 
structure, France will be able to draw on its multilateral 
knowledge with EUROMARFOR and contribute experience, 
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leadership, and assets to Mediterranean security. Adds 
VADM Steve Abbot, Commander 6th Fleet and Commander Strike 
Forces South: 
If the [European] nations have the desire and the 
political capabilities to stand up a permanent 
amphibious force, these capabilities exist. 147 
STAPHIBFORMED draws on three primary organizational 
models: the American Amphibious Ready Group; NATO's 
Combined Joint Task Force; and the Standing Naval Force 
Mediterranean. Militarily, the ARG template is the 
foundation from which STAPHIBFORMED is built. The ultimate 
goal is a flexible crisis response capability similar to 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Politically, the 
CJTF concept provides a unique departure in Alliance 
thinking that embraces multilateralism while insisting on a 
clear chain of command. STAPHIBFORMED is above all things, 
combined and joint. Lastly, STAPHIBFORMED can utilize the 
lessons learned from establishing the first Standing naval 
force in the Mediterranean. The new force can draw on the 
experience of STANAVFOMED's common doctrine, development of 
operating procedures, and solutions to command and control 
problems. 
147 Paolo Valpolini, "DYNAMIC RESPONSE puts SFOR Reserve Forces to the Test," 
Jane's Navy International, I June 1998: 12 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Standing Amphibious Force is a necessary, capable, 
and feasible concept and should be held up to scrutiny and 
examination by national governments and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 
First, the United States Department of State, on 
recommendation from the Defense Department, should study 
and endorse the STAPHIBFORMED proposal, concluding with a 
recommendation to the North Atlantic Council for adoption 
and action. 
Secondly, the NAC should direct NATO Military 
Authorities to conduct a feasibility study of the 
STAPHIBFORMED concept for inclusion in the 1999 Washington 
Summit. 
Lastly, upon successful completion of the feasibility 
study, the NAC should direct the establishment of 




STAPHIBFORMED PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE 
~ ~ 
Small deck Big deck Small deck 
1. UNITED STATES 
LPD Austin [11] LHD Wasp [6] LST Newport [2] 
LSD Anchorage [5] LHA Tarawa [5] LPD San Antonio (2003) 
LSD Whidbey Island [12] LPH Guam 
2. UNITED KINGDOM/NETHERLANDS AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP 
LPD (UK) Albion (2002) LPH (UK) Ocean LPD (NL) Rotterdam 
LPD (UK) Bulwark (2003) CV Invincible LSL(UK) Sir Galahad 
LSL (UK) Sir Beldivere CV Illustrious LSL(UK) Sir Tristam 
LSL (UK) Sir Geraint LPD (UK) Fearless 
LPD (UK) Intrepid 
3 . SPANISH-ITALIAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 
LPD (IT) San Giorgio LHD (IT) Luigi Einaudi (2005) LPD (IT) San Marco 
LPD (IT) San Giusto CV(IT) Guiseppe Garibaldi LPD (SP) Galacia 
LST (SP) Heman Cortez CV (SP) Principe de Asturias LST (SP) Pizarro 
LPA (SP) Castilla LPA (SP) Aragon 
4. FRENCH CONSORTIUM 
LSD (FR) Foudre CV Charles de Gaulle LSD (FR) Siroco 
(2000) 
LSD (FR) Ouragan CV Jeanne d'Arc LSD (FR) Orage 
LPD (FR) Bougainville CV Clemenceau LST (FR) Batral Class [5] 
CV Foch 
a. Greece 
LST (GR) Chios LST (GR) Samos 
LST (GR) Lesbos LST (GR) Rodos 
LST (GR) Ikaria LSD (GR) Cabildo 
















Cable, James, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991: Political 
Applications of Limited Naval Force. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1994 
Carr, Fergus and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European 
Order. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996 
De Wijk, Rob. NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: 
The Battle for Consensus. London: Brassey's Ltd, 1997 
Howard, Michael, The Causes of War. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1984 
Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1996 
Jordan, Robert S., Alliance Strategy and Navies. New York: 
St.Martin's Press, 1990 
Kaplan, Lawrence S., NATO and the United States. New York: 
Twayne Publishers, 1994 
Kay, Sean, NATO and the Future of European Security. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998 
Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1994 
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 
1660 - 1783. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Handbook, Brussels: NATO 
Office of Information and Press, 1995 
Patterson, James T., Grand Expectations. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996 
Sperling, James and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European 
Order. Towbridge, UK: Redwood Books, 1997 
119 
Vistica, Gregory L., Fall From Glory. New York, Simon and 
Schuster, 1995 
Young, Thomas-Durrell, ed., Command in NATO after the Cold 
War: Alliance, National, and Multinational 
Considerations. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1997 
Pamphlets: 
Drew, S. Nelson., NATO From Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-
Atlantic Security in Transition. Washington, DC: 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-98, Amphibious Forces supplement 
Johnsen, William T., NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping 
the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995 
Johnsen, William T, and Thomas Durrell-Young. 
u.S. Forward Presence in Europe: Getting 





Jopp, Mathias, Adelphi Paper 290, Strategic Implications of 
European Integration. London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1994 
Larrabee, F. Stephen and Carla Thorson, Mediterranean 
Security: New Issues and Challenges. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 1996 
Lesser, Ian and Robert Levine, eds. The RAND/Istituto 
Affari Internazionali Conference on the New 
Mediterranean Security Environment. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1993 
Lesser, Ian and Kevin N. Lewis, Airpower and Security in 
NATO's Southern Region: Alternate Concepts for a USAF 
Facility at Crotone. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991 
Morrison, James W. NATO Expansion and Alternative Future 
Security Alignments. Washington, DC: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, 1995 
120 
Periodicals: 
"22nd MEU Remains Busy," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1997 
Barnard, Bruce, "Europe's Mediterranean Menace," Journal of 
Commerce, 19 April 1994 
Blaveris, Leonidas, "Greece - Forces Change Course as Old 
Rivalries Flare," Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 November 
1997 
Clewlow, Ade, "Portugal Paves Way for Force Modernization." 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 May 1998 
Cosentino, Michele, "Multinationality: The Way Ahead for 
Western Maritime," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
March 1998 
Dahl,' Niels M., "Decisive Amphibious," Marine Corps 
Gazette, February 1950 
Deen, Thalif, "UN Approves Force to Protect Aid in 
Albania," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 April 1997 
de l'Estang, Francois Bujon, "Steadfast Allies: 'Real 
Partnership' Doesn't Preclude Contrasting views," 
Armed Forces Journal International, April 1998 
de Lionis, Andres, "The Navies of Eastern Europe: Austere 
But Evolving," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 
1997 
de Puig, Luis Maria, '''The European Security and Defence 
Identity within NATO," NATO Review, Surmner 1998 
de Santis, Nicola, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean 
Initiative," NATO Review, Spring 1998 
Drozdiak, William, "Instability to the South Worries US 
Forces in Europe," The Washington Post, 19 May 1997 
Eisenhower, Susan, "NATO Expansion: Just Say No," Armed 
Forces International, March 1998 
121 
Estes, Kenneth W., "Spain's View of Maghreb as NATO's 
Southern Flank," International Defense Review, 1 
January 1998 
"A European Amphibious Dimension?" Jane's Navy 
International, 1 September 1997 
"Exercise STRONG RESOLVE 98," NATO Review, Summer 1998 
"French Carrier for Crisis Force," Jane's Defence Weekly, 
16 October 1996 
Forster, Anthony, "An Emerging Threat Takes Shape as 
Terrorists Take to the High Seas," Jane's Intelligence 
Review, 1 July 98 
Franceschi, Bruno, "In NATO's Shadow, European Defence 
Group Looks For a Niche," Agence France Presse, 13 May 
1997 
Germain, John T., "Operation SILVER WAKE," Marine Corps 
Gazette, September 1997 
Gillum, Donald E., "Gallipoli, Its Influence on·Amphibious 
Doctrine," Marine Corps Gazette, date unknown 
Grimes, Vincent, Richard Scott and Mike Wells, "Amphibious 
Advancement," Jane's Navy International, 1 September 
1997 
Grove, Eric, "A European Navy: 
Jane's Navy International, 
New Horizon or False Dawn?" 
1 November 1996 
Grove, Eric, "Rise and Fall-A New Order in the Black Sea," 
Jane's Navy International, 1 March 1998 
Hunter, Robert E,. "NATO in the 21 st Century: A Strategic 
Vision," Parameters: Journal of the US Army War 
College, Summer 1998 
"Italians End Operation PELICAN in Albania," Agence France 
Presse, 3 December 1993 
"Jane's Defence Interview: Admiral Charles Abbot," Jane's 
Defence Weekly," 24 June 1998 
122 
Kemp, Ian, "Assault From the Sea: The Royals Advance." 
Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 June 1997 
Kemp, Ian, "WEU Moves to Bolster Military Organization," 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 May 1995 
Kolb, Richard and David Colley, "Facing Down the Soviets," 
Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine," February 1998 
Laird, Robbin F., "European Security at the Turn of the 
Century," Sea Power, January 1998 
Mason, Trevor, "Ministers Pressed to Think Again on TA 
Cuts," Press Association Newsf,ile, 19 October 1998 
Mellin, William F., "The Amphibious Force: A Ready 
Political Instrument," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, August 1977 
Messervy-Whiting, Graham, "Europe's Security and Defence 
Identity: The Western European Union's Operational 
Development," RUSI Journal (Royal United Services 
Institute for Defense Studies), April 1997 
Miller, Charles, "New NATO 'Focus' for Marines," Press 
Association Limited, 26 September 1991 
Mitchell, Steve, "Gators on the Other Side of the Pond," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1997 
Mundy, Carl E. Jr., "Soldiers of the Sea: versatile Forces 
for an Uncertain Era," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 
August 1994 
Murphy, John R., "Memories of Somalia," Marine Corps 
Gazette, April 1988 
"NATO Expansion: Who Pays?" editorial, The Detroit News, 
22 October 1997 
"NATO Studies Kosovo Military Plans," Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 1 July 1998 
"Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: Liberia," Marine Corps 
Gazette, June 1996 
123 
"Operation RESTORE HOPE," U.S. News & World Report, 14 
December 1992 
"Operation SHARP EDGE," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991 
Parks, w. Hays, "Foreign Policy and the Marine Corps," U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976 
Perimeter, Ted, "The Politics of Proximity: The Italian 
Response to the Albanian Crisis," International 
Migration Review, Spring 1998 
Petersen, Jan, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept," NATO 
Review, Summer 1998 
Pryce-Jones, David, Book review of Mordecai Bar-On, The 
Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), Middle Eastern 
Studies, January 1997 
Rice, Anthony J., "Command and Control: The Essence of 
Coalition Warfare," Parameters: Journal of the US Army 
War College, Spring 1997 
Roos, John G., "It's All About Connections," Armed Forces 
Journal International, May 1998 
Russell, W. H., "Amphibious Doctrines of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1956 
Scott, Richard and Kathleen Bunten, "Stretching to Keep a 
Global Reach," Jane's Navy International, 1 March 1997 
Scott, Richard, "UK Review Holds Key to RN's Future Carrier 
Plans," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 March 1998 
Sheridan, Michael, "Europe Must Look South, Not East," The 
Independent (London), 8 February 1995 
Thalassocrates, Alcibiades, "Luigi Einaudi: A New Carrier 
Concept for the Italian Navy," Military Technology, 
March 1998 
"Turkey and Greece Can Join Euro Forces in 1999," Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, 20 June 1998 
124 
Turner, Scott C., "The U.S. Navy in Review," u.s. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, May 1998 
Turner, VADM Stansfield, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," Naval 
War College Review, March-April 1974 
Valpolini, Paolo, "DYNAMIC RESPONSE puts SFOR Reserve 
Forces to the Test," Jane's Navy International, 1 June 
1998 
Valpolini, Paolo, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO 
Amphibious Forces," International Defense Review, 1 
July 1998 
Valpolini, Paolo, "Reaching Out Beyond the Mediterranean," 
Jane's Navy International, 1 March 1998 
Valpolini, Paolo, "Spanish-Italian Force to be Active Next 
Year," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 October 1998 
van Loon, Henry, "Amphibious Interest, European NATO-
Countries Strengthen Their Shore-Storming Capability," 
Armed Forces Journal International, September 1998 
van Loon, Henry, "NATO's Odd Man Out," Armed Forces Journal 
International, February 1998 
Woollacott, "Commentary: A Sea With Troubles on its Every 
Shore," The Guardian (London), 15 February 1997 
Zimmerman, Tim, "A Legacy of American Intervention, II u.s. 
News and World Report, 11 December 1995 
Public Documents: 
Cohen, William, "Report on Allied Contributions to the 
Common Defense: A Report to the United States 
Congress by the Secretary of Defense," March 1997 
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, 1991 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary 
(Washington DC: April 1997) 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for 
Joint Operations (Washington DC: 1 Feb 1995) 
125 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of 
the United States of America (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1996) 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of 
the United States of America (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1997) 
MC 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations 
The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 
November 1998) 
The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement (Washington DC: Government Printing 
Office, February 1996) 
Office of Naval Intelligence, Challenges to Naval 
Expeditionary Warfare (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1997) 
Briefings: 
"Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF)," XIV Spanish/USA 
Navy Staff Talks, date unknown 
"CJTF HQ Concept," NATO School (SHAPE) Brief, 17 March 1998 
Interview and Telephone Conversations: 
Dutel, LtCol Vic, Headquarters Marine Corps, PP&O 
Gruber, CDR Dave, Chief of Naval Operations, 
NATO/Europe/Russia Branch (N524) 
Communiques and Press Releases: 
AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, DETERMINED FALCON, 15 June 1998 
AFSOUTH Press Release 98-18, "Standing Naval Force 
Mediterranean to Visit Durres, Albania," 3 July 1998 
ARRC Press Release, "EUROFOR Commander Introduced to Key 
NATO Corps HQ," 27 May 1998 
126 
NATO Ministerial Communique, "Future Tasks of the Alliance 
(Harmel Report) ," 14 December 1967 
NATO Press Briefing, "Statement by the NATO Spokesman on 
Kosovo," 16 October 1998 
NATO Press Communique S-1(91)85, "The Alliance's New 
Strategic Concept," 7 Nov 1991 
NATO Press Communique S-1(91)86, "Rome Declaration on Peace 
and Cooperation," 8 November 1991 
NATO Press Communique M-NACC-1 (93 ),40, "Final Communique," 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council, 11 June 1993 
NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1(96)63, "Final Communique," 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 
June 1996 
NATO Press Communique M-NAC-1 (98)59, "Final Communique," 
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in 
Luxembourg, 28 May 1998 
NATO Press Communique M-NAC-D-1 (98)71, "Final Communique," 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence 
Ministers Session in Brussels, 11 June 1998 
NATO Press Communique M-NAC-D-1(98)77, "Statement on 
Kosovo," 11 June 1998 
NATO Press Release (98)90, "Statement by NATO Secretary 
General, Dr. Javier Solana, on Exercise DETERMINED 
FALCON," 13 June 1998 
Speeches: 
Abbot, Vice Admiral Steve, USN, Commander US Navy Sixth 
Fleet, statement before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Readiness Subcommittee, 25 February 1998 
Albright, Madeleine K., statement to the North Atlantic 
Council, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998 
127 
Clinton, President William, address to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, Berlin, 6 Sep 1996 
Cohen, William, "Shaping NATO to Meet the Challenges of the 
21st Century," remarks to the Defense Planning 
Committee, 11 June 1998 
Hunter, Ambassador Robert E., Superintendent's Guest 
Lecture address to the Naval Postgraduate School, 5 
August 1997 
Joulwan, General George A., USA, Commander in Chief United 
States European Command, statement before the House 
National Security Committee, 2 March 1995 
Pang, Frederick F. Y., statement before the Personnel Sub-
committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 
March 1996 
Rlihe, Volker, German Minister of Defense, "European 
Security and Stability-Europe Whole and Free," speech 
to the Aspen Institute and CSIS, Berlin, 14 March 1997 
Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Collective 
Security and the Post-Cold War World," speech at the 
Conference on Crisis Management and NATO Reform in 
Rome, 15 June 1998 
Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Confronting 
the Security Challenges of the New NATO," Keynote 
address at the XVth NATO workshop, Vienna, 22 June 1998 
Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Preparing NATO 
for the 21st Century." Keynote address at the Maritime 
Symposium, Lisbon, 4 September 1998 
Teti, Frank, Naval Postgraduate School Lecture, Monterey, 
CA, 12 December 1997 
Web Address: 
"Selection of Royal Navy Forces Worldwide," 
[http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/uk/med.htm]. 21 April 1998 
128 
1. 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
8725 John J. Kinman Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218 
No. of Copies 
2 
2 . Dud~ey Knox Library ................................................................................ 2 







411 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
Director, Training and Education 
MCCDC, Code C46 
1019 Elliot Rd. 
Quantico, VA 22134-5027 
Director, Marine Corps Research Cente~ 
MCCDC, Code C40RC 
2040 Broadway Street 
Quantico, VA 22134-5107 
Director, Studies and Analysis Division 
MCCDC, Code C45 
3300 Russell Road 
Quantico, VA 22134-5107 
Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Code 037, Bldg. 234, HA-220 
699 Dyer Road 





Marine Corps Tactical Systems 
Technical Advisory Branch 
Attn: Maj J.C. Cummiskey 
Box 555171 
Support Activity 1 
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5080 
Professor Richard J. Hoffman 
The Center for Civil-Military Relations 
Naval Postgraduate School, Code CM 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
129 
1 
9. Mr. Kenneth Huffman 1 
...... __ ............. _ ...... __ ... __ ... __ ................. - ......... -......................... _ ..................... _--- ...... .. 
United States Mission to NATO 
Defense Operations Division 
APO AE 09724 
10. LTC John Feeley ............................................................................................. 1 
United States Mission to NATO 
11. 
12. 
Defense Operations Division 
APO AE 09724 
LTC" Brad Naegle 
Code SM/Nb 
Naval Postgradua~e School 
555 Dyer Rd, Rrn. 206 
Monterey, CA 93943-5103 
Captain Aaron Weiss 
655 Acker PI NE 
Washington, DC 20002 
1 
2 
13. Chief of Naval Operations .................................................................... 1 
NATO/Europe/Russia Branch (N524) 
2000 Navy Pentagon, Rrn. 4E583 
Attn: CDR Jim Pelkofski 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 





Pentagon, Rrn 2D956 
Washington, DC 20318-5114 
Thomas-Durrell Young 
US Army War College 
Root Hall, Bldg 122 
Carlisle, PA 17013-5050 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OASD/ISA (European Policy) 
Pentagon, Rrn 4D762 
Washington, DC 20301 
US Department of State 
INR/EUC/ACE Rrn 4742 
Washington, DC 20520 
130 
1 
1 
1 
1 
